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“To Know Where I Have Got To”: 
 
The Postmodern Chronotope in Beckett’s Malone Dies and Coetzee’s Foe 
 
Brian McAllister 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study addresses two works of fiction—Samuel Beckett’s Malone Dies and J. 
M. Coetzee’s Foe—and is separated into two chapters. The first chapter analyzes the 
indeterminate nature of postmodern space within the two novels as related to M. M. 
Bakhtin’s idea of the chronotope found in his work The Dialogic Imagination. The 
second chapter addresses the self-reflexive creation of this postmodern space within each 
novel’s hypodiegetic narratives and discussions of narrative creation within each 
respective diegetic narratives. 
In each novel, characters as authors create or discuss “inner” narratives that 
reflect upon the way chronotopes are created in fiction and reveal problematic aspects of 
those chronotopes. This narrative creation produces what I call a “postmodern creative 
chronotope” that self-reflexively embraces indeterminacy at the same time that it 
critiques the elements that produce this indefinite relationship between time and space, a 
strategy that is especially postmodern. I contextualize the discussion by introducing 
theories of postmodernism, specifically those of Jean-François Lyotard and Linda 
Hutcheon. Lyotard’s claim that postmodernism resists totalizing structures and 
Hutcheon’s contention that it engages in a simultaneous complicity and critique inform 
the relationships between time and space in both Beckett’s and Coetzee’s text.  
iii 
Additionally, theories of postmodern space contribute to the more specific 
discussion of the postmodern chronotopes in both novels. Spatial theorists like Edward 
Soja and Henri Lefebvre, among others, have attempted to reassert issues of space in 
what has been an ontological and epistemological framework that has prioritized time. 
Their reassertion of spatiality reconnects the two halves of the spatio-temporal 
framework of the chronotope in narrative. Beckett and Coetzee employ similar 
indeterminate and self-reflexive chronotopal strategies in their novels. Coetzee, however, 
inserts a number of global/political issues into his self-reflexive discussion of chronotopal 
creation and definition. 
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Introduction 
 
I did not want to write, but I had to resign myself to it in the end. It is in 
order to know where I have got to, where he has got to. (Beckett, Malone 
Dies 207) 
 
We are accustomed to believe that our world was created by God speaking 
the Word; but I ask, may it not rather be that he wrote it, wrote a Word so 
long we have yet to come to the end of it? May it not be that God 
continually writes the world, the world and all that is in it? (Coetzee, Foe 
143) 
 
In his essay, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” M. M. Bakhtin 
establishes a direct relationship between literary time and space, establishing what he 
calls the chronotope. Implying a complex relationship between space, time, and narrative, 
Bakhtin explains a series of generic techniques that have been employed throughout 
narrative history and explains their particular spatio-temporal frameworks, mapping out 
the various shifts that have occurred within narrative space-time. 
Bakhtin is not the only twentieth-century critic to study the relationship between 
time and space in the narrative. In “Spatial Form in the Modern Novel,” Joseph Frank 
employs aspects from Laocoön, or On the Limits of Painting and Poetry, G. E. Lessing’s 
2 
eighteenth-century analysis of the spatio-temporal elements of poetry and painting. In his 
text, Lessing distinguishes painting’s spatial representation of a temporal instant with 
literature’s use of language (a succession of words) to relate an event. Literature, then, is 
inherently temporal for Lessing, while painting is spatial.1 Frank argues that early-
twentieth-century authors such as Ezra Pound, James Joyce, and Gustav Flaubert attempt 
to invert this relationship. Modern literature, he states, “is moving in the direction of 
spatial form” (8).2 
Frank’s analysis, like Lessing’s initial work, relies upon the disjunction of time 
and space (Holtz 277).3 Neither Lessing nor Frank addresses the possibility that time and 
space may exist within a kind of complementary relationship, as has been theorized by 
twentieth-century physicists like Albert Einstein. Conversely, Bakhtin’s chronotope, 
inspired by Einstein’s theory of relativity,4 offers a more sophisticated and nuanced 
understanding of literary time and space. Whereas Frank and Lessing disconnect time 
from space, Bakhtin’s chronotope demands an essential interconnectedness that 
establishes definitions for space and time through their relationship to one another. 
Unfortunately, Bakhtin’s chronotopal analysis—begun in 1937, not completed 
until 1973, and translated into English in 1981—includes texts from no later than the 
                                                 
1 Lessing’s text is by no means the first to address this spatio-temporal relationship between 
painting and literature. In the Ars Poetica (ca. 10 B.C.E.), Horace states, “Poetry is like painting. Some 
attracts you more if you stand near, some if you’re further off” (132). Laocoön is, in fact, largely a response 
to this classical simile. 
2 For example, in his analysis of Proust, Frank states that “to experience the passage of time, […] 
it was necessary to rise above it and to grasp both past and present simultaneously in a moment of what he 
called ‘pure time,’” a sensation that is not temporal (24). 
3 Some critics of Frank’s essay have challenged the oversimplification in his claim that modern 
literature inverts Lessing’s space/time relationship. For example, William Holtz contends that Frank “has 
allowed himself to be misled by the pictorial metaphor which […] introduces irrelevancies when used as an 
analogy to argue from painting to literature” (274). 
4 Bakhtin states that the chronotope (space-time ) “is employed in mathematics, and was 
introduced as part of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. […] [W]e are borrowing it for literary criticism 
almost as a metaphor (almost, but not quite)” (84). For further discussion of the relationship between 
relativity and the chronotope, see Holquist 158-62. 
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nineteenth century. Limited by history and perhaps restricted by Soviet censorship to 
those particular texts,5 Bakhtin’s analysis of the chronotope includes no modern or 
postmodern novels. This study attempts to fill in a small portion of this critical gap. 
Addressing the spatio-temporal strategies employed within Samuel Beckett’s Malone 
Dies (1956) and J. M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986), it attempts to establish the epistemological 
and ontological dialogues in the chronotopes of these postmodern narratives. 
These two texts employ similar strategies that distinguish them within the broad 
spectrum that is the postmodern novel and offer particularly focused views of the 
postmodern chronotope. In both works, characters as authors create or discuss “inner” 
narratives that reflect upon the way chronotopes are created in fiction and reveal 
problematic aspects of those chronotopes. This narrative creation produces what I call a 
“postmodern creative chronotope” that embraces indeterminacy at the same time that it 
self-reflexively critiques the elements that produce this indefinite relationship between 
time and space. 
Jean-François Lyotard offers a distinction between modernist and postmodernist 
narratives that helps to clarify the indefinite nature of the postmodern creative chronotope 
within Malone Dies and Foe. He contends that, for postmodern knowledge, “consensus is 
a horizon that is never reached” (61). Knowledge is always in the process of being made 
and redefined. Similarly, we can say that the postmodern chronotope never arrives at a 
unified definition. For Lyotard, modernist narratives “allows the unpresentable to be put 
forward only as the missing contents” (81) Postmodernism, on the other hand, “puts 
forward the unpresentable in presentation itself.” If we think of this in regards to the 
                                                 
5 Bakhtin began writing his essay on the chronotope one year after returning from exile in 
Kazakhstan.  
4 
chronotope, postmodernism directly addresses the dialogue within the continuous process 
of establishing chronotopal definition. 
Contemporary theories of postmodern space also serve to contextualize this 
discussion of Beckett’s and Coetzee’s novels. Spatial theorists like Edward Soja and 
Henri Lefebvre attempt to reassert issues of space in what has been a predominantly 
temporal framework in twentieth-century geography. Whereas modern concepts of 
geography are predominantly subordinated to statistical and historical frameworks, 
Lefebvre and Soja, among others, reemphasize the importance of space and spatiality as 
ways of knowing the world. I use their reassertion of spatiality as a method of seeing the 
way that postmodernism reconnects the two halves of the narrative chronotope. 
The postmodern novel becomes a narrative space in which this reconnection and 
reevaluation of space and time becomes explicit, demonstrated most clearly in Malone 
Dies and Foe. Beckett’s and Coetzee’s novels engage this spatio-temporal discourse, 
employing similar indeterminate and self-reflexive chronotopal strategies. Coetzee, 
however, inserts a number of explicitly political issues into his self-reflexive discussion 
of chronotopal creation and definition. He addresses the role of gender, race, and empire 
as factors that affect the formation of particular spatio-temporal definitions throughout 
the text. In the first chapter, I argue that the postmodern chronotope is necessarily 
indeterminate and informed by theoretical reconceptions of space and time. Malone Dies 
and Foe constantly challenge and reevaluate spatio-temporal relations so that absolute 
chronotopal definition becomes impossible and, more importantly, undesired. 
The second chapter addresses the self-reflexive creation of this indeterminate 
space within each novel’s hypodiegetic narratives and discussions of narrative creation 
5 
within the diegetic narratives. By self-reflexively addressing the nature of their 
chronotopal frameworks, these two novels reveal their complicity in the establishment of 
the indeterminate (and often politically charged) chronotopal frameworks that they are 
critiquing. Ultimately, it is the combination of indeterminacy and self-reflexivity that 
distinguishes the postmodern creative chronotope from other narrative conceptions of 
time and space. 
The two epigrams above acknowledge this spatio-temporal relationship and hint 
at the combination of indeterminacy and self-reflexivity within the postmodern 
chronotope. Furthermore, they recognize the desire to understand relationships between 
individual narratives, space, and time. When the eponymous, hypodiegetic narrator of 
Beckett’s novel claims that he writes “in order to know where I have got to, where he has 
got to,” he recognizes the spatiality implicit in the creation of narrative. Narrative 
becomes a means to temporarily establish location. Through writing, Malone attempts to 
define space. Narrative creation becomes conflated with a kind of geographic 
stabilization, and Malone may only locate himself within the world through writing. 
Location and identity become necessarily linked through the narrative process. 
And when Susan Barton, the narrator of Coetzee’s text, claims that “God 
continually writes the world […] and all that is in it,” she implies the revision and re-
inscription of narrative spatial definitions. Barton conflates creation of the world and 
creation of narrative. By positing an overtly spatialized narrative, Coetzee’s text connects 
the establishment of space and time. These two elements develop simultaneously and 
build from one another in a way that relies upon a narrative framework. Both location 
within the world and the continuous creation of the world through writing imply an 
6 
implicit connection between space and narrative. The continuous nature of this creation 
demands indeterminacy. For these novels, the connection of word and world and the 
continuous (temporal) creation of both demand an interrelationship between space, time, 
and narrative. 
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Chapter One: 
The Spatial Turn and Indeterminacy in the Postmodern Chronotope 
 
J. M. Coetzee, in “Homage,” discusses the influence of various authors on his 
own writing. Two prose authors caught his attention during his early twenties: Ford 
Madox Ford and Samuel Beckett. While his opinion of Ford has changed,6 he still claims 
to derive great influence from Beckett’s work.7 Coetzee states, 
Beckett in English […] made up something the like of which I had not 
seen before in the language. […] In Beckett’s case, this comes down to a 
certain counterpointing of thought and syntax. […] It comes down to a 
certain dancing of the intellect that is full of energy yet remains confined. 
[…] The deepest lessons one learns from other writers are […] matters of 
rhythm, broadly conceived. (6) 
Critics have noted this linguistic connection between Beckett and Coetzee,8 but I argue 
that this influence goes beyond rhythm and syntax to include issues of time and space 
                                                 
6 Concerning his changed opinion of Ford, Coetzee states, “Quite aside from the fact that Ford 
rarely gave himself the time to write as well as he could […], his writing now strikes me as rather 
mannered in its programmatic adherence to an impressionist psychology of perception, and also infected 
with a certain remorselessly elegiac tone” (“Homage” 6). 
7 In an interview with David Atwell, Coetzee has acknowledged this influence, stating, “Beckett 
has meant a great deal to me in my own writing—that must be obvious. He is a clear influence on my 
prose” (“Beckett” 25). In his introduction to the fourth volume of The Grove Centenary Edition of 
Beckett’s work, Coetzee states that “Beckett was an artist possessed by a vision of life without consolation 
or dignity or promise of grace. […] It was a vision to which he gave expression in language of a virile 
strength and intellectual subtlety that marks him as one of the great prose stylists of the twentieth century” 
(xiv). 
8 See, for example, Kellman. 
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within narrative. By looking at works like Beckett’s Malone Dies and Coetzee’s Foe, one 
sees both authors’ concerns with narrative space and time. Both novels incorporate 
spatio-temporal discourse within their narratives. Implicit in these discourses is a 
postmodern redefinition of the relationship between literary time and space—what M. M. 
Bakhtin calls the chronotope—which finds its origins in the theories of postmodern 
geography. 
 
Political and Ideological Space: The Indeterminate Postmodern Chronotope 
In “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” Bakhtin describes an 
“intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
expressed in literature” (84). Calling this connected relationship the chronotope, Bakhtin 
goes on to explain how time and space exist not as distinct and separable elements but, 
instead, as a “concrete whole.” Therefore, while we may be able to distinguish time and 
space abstractly, “living artistic perception” cannot make such a division (243). Bakhtin 
analyzes and defines specific chronotopes throughout literary history, from the folkloric 
chronotope to the chronotope of the chivalric romance to the Rabelaisian chronotope.9 
Narrative chronotopes—no matter their particular form—depend upon the 
external chronotope of reality for definition. In each of these specific chronotopes, 
Bakhtin defines relationships between narrative space and time and acknowledges the 
dependence of these chronotopes on other larger spatio-temporal structures that, 
according to Bakhtin, include 
                                                 
9 For example, Bakhtin discusses a distinct temporal trait of folktales “about paradise, a Golden 
Age, a heroic age, an ancient truth” (147). These myths tend to locate idealized categories of humanity 
(e.g., “purpose, ideal, justice, perfection”) in the past. Calling this chronotopal trait “historical inversion,” 
Bakhtin acknowledges that it “is in no sense part of the past’s reality, but a thing that is in its essence a 
purpose, an obligation” (147). 
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the reality reflected in the text, the authors creating the text, the performers 
of the text (if they exist) and finally the listeners or readers who recreate 
and in so doing renew the text. (253) 
Importantly, this external chronotope is both practical and theoretical. So while the 
narrative chronotope may depend upon practical issues (whether scientific or 
technological) for meaning, it relies equally upon philosophical and political elements in 
delineating its particular relationship between time and space. Paul Smethurst stresses the 
importance of maintaining this separation between the created chronotope of the narrative 
and the external, creating chronotope of the world, particularly when analyzing the effect 
of postmodernism on narrative. He posits that, in the creation of a postmodern narrative, 
“the boundary line between an actual world and the world as represented in the text is 
maintained, even if it has become, or perhaps always was, a very soft and permeable 
boundary” (12).  
When analyzing a narrative, one must make the distinction between the diegetic 
narrative (including the chronotope of the story itself) and the extradiegetic world (from 
which the diegetic narrative receives its spatial and temporal references). For Michael 
Holquist, “the chronotope provides a means to explore the complex, indirect, and always 
mediated relationship between art and life” (111). The question then arises: is there a 
(postmodern) chronotope that receives its spatio-temporal structure from the theories and 
philosophies of postmodernism? Though establishing a mutually equal relationship, 
Bakhtin clearly prioritizes time over space in the chronotope. While discussing the 
relationship between chronotope and genre, he states that “it is precisely the chronotope 
that defines genre and generic distinctions, for in literature the primary category of the 
10 
chronotope is time” (85). Or consider the title of his essay: “Forms of Time and of the 
Chronotope in the Novel.” His spatio-temporal theories cannot resist the prioritization of 
time. 
This temporality, however, is not surprising. As Edward Soja recognizes, space 
has been subordinate to time throughout twentieth-century critical theory. As an antidote, 
in his work Soja refers to cities like Los Angeles10 to “spatialize the conventional 
narrative by recomposing the intellectual history of critical social theory around the 
evolving dialectics of space, time, and social being” (3). Soja argues that modernism 
essentially stripped geography of its power and lifted history to a favored status within its 
theoretical framework. During the extended fin de siècle, 
the politics and ideology embedded in the social construction of human 
geographies and the crucially important role the manipulation of these 
geographies played in the late nineteenth-century restructuring and early 
twentieth-century expansion of capitalism seemed to become either 
invisible or increasingly mystified, left, right, and centre. (34) 
For Soja, modernism emphasized history at the expense of geography. Rather than an 
actual force in the shaping of society and theory, space became “a reflective mirror of 
societal modernization” (33). 
 Henri Lefebvre provides the impetus for a postmodern spatio-temporal 
realignment. Establishing a dialectic relationship between space and societal 
organization, Lefebvre challenges the notion of space as a primordial canvas on which 
societies organize themselves. Instead, for him, “(social) space is a (social) product” 
                                                 
10 See his self-described “free-wheeling” chapter “Taking Los Angeles Apart: Towards a 
Postmodern Geography” or his “more concrete regional geography” in “It All Comes Together in Los 
Angeles” (2-3). 
11 
(Production 26). While space serves to define and refine society, society also invests 
space with practical, political, and philosophical meanings. According to Lefebvre, the 
definition and redefinition of space are a political process. As he states, 
If space has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its contents 
and thus seems to be “purely” formal, the epitome of rational abstraction, 
it is precisely because it has been occupied and used, and has already been 
the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident on the 
landscape. Space has been shaped and molded from historical and natural 
elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and 
ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies. (“Reflections” 
31) 
Lefebvre politicizes and prioritizes space, reclaiming its theoretical force from the 
modernist historicity that had once concealed it. 
 This reclamation of space in the dialectical framework, however, does not simply 
invert the power structure. Instead, this spatial turn reformulates the relationship between 
time and space. Existing in a constantly reactive and interactive relationship, both are 
constantly redefined according to their association with each other. This reassertion of the 
spatial viewpoint does not eliminate narrative time. Instead, it produces a radical 
alteration of the spatio-temporal axis. As Smethurst states, 
The postmodern chronotope […] registers a shift in sensibilities from a 
predominantly temporal and historiographic imagination to one much 
more concerned with the spatial and the geographic, as categories in their 
own right than as spatialised histories. (15) 
12 
These realignments of spatiality begin to reflect the external chronotope of theorists like 
Lefebvre and Soja, in which space becomes more than an empty vessel waiting to be 
filled. 
Spatial reaffirmation challenges a variety of narrative theorists. For example, 
Soja’s assertion of space in art (and literature) contests Gérard Genette’s statement in 
Narrative Discourse that “the temporal determinations of the narrating instance are 
manifestly more important than its spatial determinations” (215). Genette goes on to state 
that 
I can very well tell a story without specifying the place where it happens, 
and whether the place is more or less distant from the place where I am 
telling it; nevertheless it is almost impossible for me not to locate the story 
in time with respect to my narrating act, since I must necessarily tell the 
story in a present, past, or future tense. (215) 
Much like the modernists that made space an adjunct of time, Genette not only prioritizes 
time over space; he eliminates space entirely as a determining narrative element.11  
But if narrative requires interconnectedness between time and space, Genette’s 
supposed ability to tell a story without acknowledging space appears problematic. 
Genette’s idea reflects what Lefebvre calls the “illusion of transparency,” which masks 
the essential fact that space is a product and not an empty arena. In the illusion of 
transparency “space appears as luminous, as intelligible, as giving action free rein” (27). 
This illusion stresses speech and believes that “social transformation [can] be brought 
about by means of communication alone” (29). Genette emphasizes the act of telling and 
                                                 
11 This is partially a result of Genette’s focus on Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, a text that relies 
heavily upon history and memory in its narrative strategies. 
13 
ignores the importance of space, thus falling prey to what Lefebvre might call “a trap, 
operating on the basis of its own quasi-magical power” (29). 
As Patricia Yaeger describes, a realignment of spatio-temporal relationships 
resists the traditional or “comforting” structure of story (4). Eliminating the hierarchical 
relationship between time and space contests conventions that we have assimilated “from 
the earliest moments of childhood.” Yaeger explains the difference in perception: 
Space is a fragmentary field of action […] which appears to be negotiable 
or continuous but is actually peppered with chasms of economic and 
cultural disjunctions. In contrast, time has seemed, until recently, 
consolingly linear. While temporal narratives (like histories or 
chronologies) offer a comforting seriality that initiates the queuelike 
patterns of traditional narrative, space moves out in all directions at once, 
and it is difficult to imagine a narrative structure capable of capturing this 
multiplicity. 
This seemingly innate order within the historical narrative is actually a product of its own 
fiction. The creation of the historical narrative requires a creation of its own particular 
chronotope. Elements that do not fit are eliminated, as are the mundane and irrelevant. 
The temporal narrative seems linear and reassuringly serial only because individual 
storytellers (e.g., historians, chronologist, authors) have constructed it to be so, having 
been influenced by conventions of their time and place. 
Even Michel Foucault (who once admitted that “geography acted as the support, 
the condition for possibility for the passage between a series of factors I tried to relate” 
[“Questions” 77]) has serious reservations about a narrative in which space dominates. In 
14 
his book The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault’s writing threatens to end in “an as yet 
uncharted land and unforeseeable conclusion” (39). He asks the question, “Is there not 
the danger that everything that has so far protected the historian […] may disappear, 
leaving for analysis a blank indifferent space, lacking in both interiority and promise?” 
Foucault’s work often relies on discourses pertaining to space.12 Here, however, he 
speculates on the possible chaos of spatialized narrative. 
To prevent this empty spatial narrative and see that indeterminacy does not 
necessarily lead to indifference, we must return to Soja. For him an essential aspect of the 
spatial turn is a “rejection of the totalizing ‘deep logics’ that blinker our ways of seeing” 
(73). Universalist frameworks provide artificial limitations that “blinker” us from other 
potential paths of understanding. Instead, Soja calls for the rejection of such 
epistemological absolutism. His attempt to expose “the disheveled tangle of threads that 
constitute the intellectual history of critical social thought” (73) parallels Jean-François 
Lyotard’s own concept of postmodernism as an “incredulity toward metanarratives” 
(xxiv). Lyotard makes a sharp distinction between the modern and the postmodern. The 
modern is related to “any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse 
[…] making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative” (xxiii). Instead of the 
metanarrative, postmodernism has embraced “the little narrative [petit récit]” as its 
“quintessential form of imaginative invention” (60). Instead of the grand narratives of 
modernism (which often reinforce or simply reverse established power structures), 
postmodernism produces micronarratives in which “knowledge is not simply a tool of the 
authorities,” where “its principle is not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s 
paralogy” (xxv). For Lyotard, postmodernism produces narratives that were silenced by 
                                                 
12 e.g., the prison, the asylum. 
15 
the grand narrative. Both Lyotard and Soja reject fixity and embrace flexibility. 
Importantly, each sees postmodern sensibilities as rejections of certain aspects of 
modernism. Lyotard discards modernism’s attempt (and ultimate failure) to achieve 
metanarrative. For Soja, postmodernism rejects modernism’s prioritization of history at 
the expense of space. 
Similarly, Linda Hutcheon discusses the way that postmodernism both 
undermines and reinforces the power and influence of history and narrative. 
Postmodernism embraces a paradoxical “complicity and critique” that “inscribes and 
subverts the conventions and ideologies of the dominant culture and social forces of the 
twentieth-century western world” (11). Hutcheon distinguishes postmodern architecture 
from its modern predecessor: 
Postmodern architecture is plural and historical, not pluralist and 
historicist; it neither ignores nor condemns the long heritage of its built 
culture—including the modern. It uses the reappropriated forms of the past 
to speak to a society from within the values and history of that society, 
while still questioning it. (12) 
Modern architecture, on the other hand, made a “deliberate break with history,” in 
Hutcheon’s view, causing “a destruction of the connection to the way human society had 
come to relate to space over time” (11).13 Postmodern architecture, on the other hand, 
                                                 
13 Frederic Jameson offers another interpretation of this break between Modern and Postmodern 
architecture. Using the Bonaventura Hotel in Los Angeles, Jameson believes that it embodies “postmodern 
hyperspace,” and has “finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to 
locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a 
mappable external world” (83). Jameson claims postmodernism has left its human subjects to wander in 
spaces which they have no capacity to define. The spatial indeterminacy is byproduct of the logic of late 
capitalism rather than an epistemological necessity. He claims that other definitions of postmodernism 
produce “moral judgements (about which it is indifferent whether they are positive or negative).” His 
16 
both derives from and challenges previous forms of architecture.14 Modernist architecture 
mirrors Soja’s description of modernism’s “growing submergence and dissipation of the 
geographical imagination, a virtual annihilation of space by time in critical social thought 
and discourse” (31). Soja describes how the break that modernist architecture makes with 
past architectural forms parallels a break within Western Marxism between history and 
geography throughout the twentieth century. Prior to Western Marxism’s “spatial turn” in 
the 1960s—which he distinguishes from the “hegemonic, rigid, establishmentarian” 
Leninist Marxist of Eastern Europe (30)—such geographical theorization was limited to 
“small pockets” of urban ecology and regional historiography (38). Modern Geography 
was relegated to a field of measurement, thus stripping it of theoretical power. 
What arises from postmodern discourse is a narrative structure with a very loose 
spatio-temporal axis. If we look at Hutcheon’s postmodernism, space and time exist 
dialectically, both undermining and reasserting their roles within a particular chronotope. 
Postmodernism reconnects time and space, a connection that was lost in modernism. But 
that connection is tenuous (and constantly challenged). What Hutcheon makes most clear 
is postmodernism’s acknowledgement that these connections—in whatever form they 
may exist—are cultural products rather than naturalized or essentialized frameworks (32). 
                                                                                                                                                 
produces a “genuinely dialectical attempt to think our present of time in History.” In postmodern space, one 
is incapable of rising above ideology because it permeates everything. 
Jameson sees a danger in the subversive and deconstructive nature of postmodernism. It creates 
the illusion of the possibility for critical distance when, in Jameson’s view, such distance cannot exist. 
Hutcheon, on the other hand, posits that the postmodern tendency to “legitimize culture (high and mass) 
even as it subverts it” lessens this danger (15). For her, “the function of the irony of postmodern discourse 
to posit that critical distance and then undo it […] prevents any possible critical urge to ignore or trivialize 
historical-political questions.” Critique of the reprehensible aspect of postmodernity (like the Bonaventura 
Hotel) occurs while still existing within the framework of postmodernity. Jameson’s critique of such 
postmodernism seems problematic when we consider that its use of irony challenges such moralist 
approaches. 
14 For many critics, this is not necessarily a positive development. Smethurst describes recent 
trends in postmodern architecture—particularly in Hong Kong—as “diluted” and “driven by fashion and 
economic forces rather than design principles” (27). Hong Kong is “a city without history” for Smethurst, 
and seems content to simulate New York and European cities. 
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She sees postmodernism as a “self-conscious, self-contradictory, self-undermining 
statement” that attempts to “de-naturalize some of the dominant features of our way of 
life; to point out that those entities that we unthinkingly experience as ‘natural’ (they may 
include capitalism, patriarchy, liberal humanism) are in fact ‘cultural’” (1-2). In other 
words, postmodern space is a constantly questioned space. 
Furthermore, Lyotard’s ideas and their relationship to the postmodern geographies 
of Lefebvre and Soja provide insight into the relationships within temporal and spatial 
definitions. Lyotard’s description of the end of metanarrative within postmodernism and 
Soja’s rejection of totalizing logics create, for the postmodern chronotope, the possibility 
of micro-geographies and micro-histories. Therefore, in addition to the dialectical 
relationship that exists between time and space (what I am calling “interchronotopal”), 
there also exists a dialectical relationship within the two (or “intrachronotopal”). Various 
spaces and definitions of spaces struggle and negotiate within a larger chronotope. 
Similarly, histories and temporal frameworks engage in this dialectical process. Lyotard 
discusses this struggle and negotiation within postmodern art: 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of 
good forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to 
share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches 
for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to present a 
stronger sense of the unpresentable. (81) 
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The chronotope for postmodern art must then reflect this denial of “the solace of good 
forms” and consensus. A firm spatio-temporal alignment becomes unattainable, 
unnecessary, and undesirable within a postmodern chronotope.15 
These postmodern theorists provide a means to analyze the spatio-temporal 
frameworks of Beckett’s and Coetzee’s works. These two novels offer discourses on the 
indeterminate relationship within and between time and space. Samuel Beckett’s Malone 
Dies (1956) and J. M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986), seemingly incompatible, maintain the 
important similarity of the postmodern chronotope. This first chapter will focus upon 
basic elements of the postmodern chronotope in both novels. Later, a look at the hypo- 
and hyper-diegetic elements in these two works will address their self-reflexivity in 
regards to the formations of their specific postmodern chronotopes. By focusing on the 
diegetic narratives, I will reveal the spatio-temporal indeterminacy of the postmodern 
chronotope. 
 
“Six Planes of Solid Bone”: Malone Dies16 
For the eponymous narrator of Malone Dies, even the chronotope of his room and 
its immediate surroundings proves dynamic and incapable of finite definition. The floor 
and the building in which his room is located are unclear. Through a single window, he is 
                                                 
15 Barry Rutland, in his essay “Bakhtinian Categories and the Discourse of Postmodernism,” offers 
another interpretation of the postmodern chronotope. Rather than seeing a total annihilation of the grand 
narrative, Rutland argues that a new metanarrative has come to replace that of “Reason and Progress”: “the 
Green Story of environmental conservation, sustainable growth, and equitable sharing” (133). In this new 
metanarrative, “nationalist-imperialist objectives” no longer dictate the world geography. Instead, 
geography relies on “a continuous generation of cultural energy through displacement for reinvestment in 
labour and consumption” for definition, requiring perpetual dialogical change. 
16 I use the English title and the English translation of the text because, as many critics have noted, 
it is possible (and, for some, necessary) to consider Malone Dies and Malone Meurt two different works. 
For a discussion of Beckett’s self-translations and the problems of critical reception in French and English, 
see Fitch. 
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given a small glimpse of the outside world but is unsure of its contents. He hears noises. 
Time passes in intervals that he cannot fully understand. In his spatial and temporal 
speculations, Malone reaffirms yet resists his conclusion that “I shall go on doing as I 
have always done, not knowing what it is I do, nor who I am, nor where I am, nor if I 
am” (226 italics added). Despite the near impossibility of defining his surroundings, his 
spatial negotiation places him within a social setting that defines and affirms his 
existence.  
 Malone, at one point, makes a statement that closely parallels Hutcheon’s concept 
of postmodernism and its relationship to the chronotope. Differentiating between “the 
light of the outer world” and his own, Malone describes this outer world as a place where 
people “know the sun and moon emerge at such and such an hour and at such another 
plunge again below the surface” (221). These people in this external space “rely on this” 
physical sign of passing time. From this outer world and its people, Malone distinguishes 
his world and himself. In his internal world there is “never really light” and “all is in a 
kind of leaden light that makes no shadow, so that it is hard to say from what direction it 
comes, for it seems to come from all directions at once, and with equal force” (220). 
Whereas light (and absence of light) dictates periods of time within the external world, 
such temporal divisions are absent from Malone’s. Additionally, in the outer world, these 
temporal divisions have sources (e.g., the sun and the moon) that provide an important 
causal link between time and space. Such a link does not exist overtly in Malone’s world. 
His world enjoys “a kind of night and day,” but it is quite different from the night and 
day that he once experienced in this external world (220). Malone, at one point, states, “I 
see there is no possibility of making light, artificial light” (221). Colors within his room 
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do not “always seem to depend on the time of day” and he is able to state that “my night 
is not the sky’s.” Consider Malone’s personal temporal referents in terms of Hutcheon’s 
postmodernity, which suggests 
that notions of truth, reference, and the non-cultural real have not ceased 
to exist […] but that they are no longer unproblematic issues, assumed to 
be self-evident and self-justifying. […] The postmodern is […] a 
questioning of what reality can mean and how we come to know it (32). 
Malone, by referring back to his historical existence within a specific temporal 
framework, recognizes the problematic definition of terms as seemingly basic as “night” 
and “day.” 
 Separated from his room by “the pane, misted and smeared with the filth of years” 
(198), the outer world represents a chronotope different from his own. In it, time and 
space are linked to the sun and the moon. People shape their lives to fit within this 
connection between time and space; however, for Malone’s inner world, such 
connections are not explicit. Time and space seem disconnected in that there are few 
spatial markers for the passing of time (no clear change in the light, no rising and setting 
sun, no moon). In Malone’s world, chronotopal structures seem to have come unglued. 
But this is not entirely true. As we see with his mentions of prior events and his desire to 
pinpoint the date, time and space in Malone’s world are not entirely separated. He admits 
that his world “too has its alternations, I will not deny it, its dusks and dawns, but that is 
what I say, for I too must have lived, once out there, and there is no recovering from that” 
(221). 
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Malone attempts (and ultimately fails) to find spatio-temporal definition for his 
inner world—no matter how threadbare that connection might be—through its dialectical 
interaction with the chronotope of the outer world and his remembrance of his time in it. 
While there may be no literal dawn within his room, no rising of the sun in the eastern 
horizon, his interaction with this outer world, which he admits must have happened at one 
point, has infiltrated his inner world. What we see, then, is a postmodern embrace of the 
historical over the historicist (Hutcheon 12). In the light and dark within and without his 
room, Malone has trouble establishing a totalizing formula that restricts his spatial 
definition. His conceptions of his current space are informed and challenged by his 
history in this outer, lighted world. 
Similarly, the outer world (of which Malone seems to no longer be a member) 
exists for Malone primarily in its relationship to the inner world. It is an “other” space. 
His very use of the words “outer” and “old” requires an “inner” and “new” and, hence, 
shapes his world and its chronotope. “The old world cloisters me,” he states at one point, 
happy that the “search for myself has ended” (199). But, despite its supposed ending, he 
continues to 
go back again to the lights, to the fields I so longed to love, to the sky all 
astir with little white clouds as white and light as snowflakes, to the life I 
could never manage, through my own fault perhaps, through pride, or 
pettiness, but I don’t think so. (199) 
Despite his separation and indeterminate speculation about this world outside the walls 
and window of his room, he depends on that world to frame his own. In this way, 
Malone’s dialectical chronotope embodies the postmodern tendency to undermine and 
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reassert simultaneously. If we return to Hutcheon’s words, Malone’s chronotope appears 
postmodern in that it “inscribes and subverts” (11) through the dialectical interactions 
between inner and outer worlds.  
In addition to this interchrontopal action between inner and outer worlds, a variety 
of intrachronotopal negotiations take place, both spatially and temporally, to contribute to 
the overall postmodern chronotope of the narrative. In the first sentences of the novel, 
Malone states, rather bluntly, 
I shall soon be quite dead at last in spite of it all. Perhaps next month. 
Then it will be the month of April or of May. Perhaps I am wrong, perhaps 
I shall survive Saint John the Baptist’s Day and even the Fourteenth of 
July, festival of freedom. Indeed I would not put it past me to pant on to 
the Transfiguration, not to speak of the Assumption. But I do not think so, 
I do not think I am wrong in saying that these rejoicings will take place in 
my absence this year. (179) 
These initial sentences situate Malone within a temporal structure related to the outer 
world. But it is not a structure that relies upon the phases of the moon or the alignment of 
stars. Instead, Malone uses holidays (both holy and political) as mile markers toward his 
inevitable death.17 These markers, however, shift as he continues to live. Through these 
religious and national events, Malone inserts the inevitable (though unpredictable) event 
of his death into a socially created temporal framework, one that relies upon previous 
human and spiritual events as markers. His attempt to predict the date of his own death is 
                                                 
17 Saint John the Baptist Day is on 24 June. The Fourteenth of July refers to the French Fête 
Nationale which celebrates the storming of the Bastille in 1789. The Catholic Church celebrates the 
Transfiguration of Christ on 6 August. The Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary is held on 
15 August. 
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also a fairly problematic endeavor and resists exact definition. One cannot know with 
certainty when one’s death will come until it has arrived. Malone’s shaky prognostication 
blatantly undermines his own attempt at intrachronotopal definition by relying upon an 
event that cannot be determined. 
 Malone’s inner temporal framework is imprecise at best and constantly 
renegotiated. The inability to pinpoint exact dates or times occurs throughout the novel, 
often the result of his admitted failing memory. In determining his own age, Malone 
declares, “I know the year of my birth […] but I do not know what year I have got to 
now” (185-86). He speculates that he is an “octogenarian” but cannot be sure. He has 
moments when he feels that he may have always existed within his room, but these pass 
(249). Beckett engages in what Hutcheon describes as postmodernism’s refusal “to stay 
neatly within accepted conventions and traditions,” instead deploying “hybrid forms and 
seemingly mutually contradictory strategies” in an attempt to “frustrate critical attempts 
[…] to systematize them” (35). The reader is perpetually forced to reevaluate the 
chronotopal framework of the narrative because of the diverse, speculative techniques. 
Constantly renegotiating his existence within the room through tools as diverse (and 
unreliable) as religious holidays, his inevitable death, and his shaky memory prevents any 
systematization by both Malone and, hyperdiegetically, the reader. 
Malone also has trouble establishing his exact location, further problematizing the 
postmodern chronotope of the narrative. He states, 
Unfortunately I do not know quite what floor I am on, perhaps I am only 
on the mezzanine. The doors banging, the steps on the stairs, the noises in 
the street, have not enlightened me, on this subject. […] Perhaps after all I 
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am in a kind of vault and this space which I take to be the street in reality 
no more than a wide trench or ditch with other vaults opening upon it. 
(219) 
Hearing noises above and below him, he wonders if “there are other vaults even deeper 
than mine” (219). Malone even hypothesizes that his room is actually “in a head and that 
these eight, no, six, these six planes that enclose me are of solid bone” (221). This head, 
he insists, is not his own.18 But even in this hypothesis, he refuses to become completely 
solipsistic. If it is a skull, it is the skull of another, and he would reside in the space of the 
brain.19 Malone continues to look outward—to the possible skull—for his spatial 
definitions. 
Each of Malone’s speculations offers possible, though by no means absolute, 
solutions for his attempt to understand his surrounding space. His spatial and temporal 
redefinitions serve as intrachronotopal negotiations that complement his interchronotopal 
interactions. His room might be within a hospital. He may also be many levels 
underground in some sort of prison. Or he may exist as the idea within the skull of 
another person. Each offers a possible—and no less likely—definition for Malone’s 
surroundings. So, whether weeks or minutes have passed, and whether Malone is in a 
vault, a hospital or another’s skull, each of Malone’s interpretations of time and space 
engages him in an extreme postmodern indeterminacy which, as Soja notes, resists the 
totalizing effect of logic and categorical thinking (Soja 73). 
                                                 
18 The skull as embodied space appears in many of Beckett’s works. For examples, see Ill Seen Ill 
Said (“the madhouse of the skull” [Nohow On 58]), the poem “The Vulture” (“dragging his hunger through 
the sky/of my skull shell of sky and earth” [10]), and “Not I” (“all the time the buzzing…so-called…in the 
ears…though of course actually…not in the ears at all…in the skull…dull roar in the skull” [407]). 
19 This space can be read as Samuel Beckett’s skull. Malone, then exists only as Beckett’s creation 
within Beckett’s brain. The reference to authorship would further problematize the spatio-temporal 
relationship. See chapter two for further discussion. 
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Even Malone’s body rejects totalization and becomes a negotiated space. As the 
narrative progresses, his body becomes less his own. He disassociates his identity from 
all of its parts, save his head. His feet “are leagues away” (234). His fingers “write in 
other latitudes.” Even bodily acts seem to happen in other places, and he believes that “if 
my arse suddenly started to shit at the present moment, which God forbid, I firmly 
believe the lumps would fall out in Australia” (235). In his final moments, he states that 
“the feet are clear already, of the great cunt of existence. […] My head will be the last to 
die” (283). In the process of death, his body becomes compartmentalized and prioritized. 
As death works its way upward from his feet through his legs and onward until finally 
reaching the head, Malone’s body becomes a space separate from him and contributing to 
the chronotope in which he exists. His definition of himself shifts, as do his definitions of 
time and space throughout the novel, until limbs and torso become separate things and his 
head remains the only part that he calls “I.” 
For a novel as enclosed as Malone Dies, its chronotope forms primarily through 
Malone’s outward observations. He looks to the window. He listens for sounds outside 
his room. He compares his inner light to the outer sunshine and moonlight. The 
chronotope finds its spatial definition in this outward reach. Similarly, the temporal 
aspects of the novel rely upon a constant interactivity. Bakhtin suggests that 
where there is no passage of time there is also no moment of time. […] If 
taken outside its relationship to past and future, the present loses its 
integrity, breaks down into isolated phenomena and objects, making of 
them a mere abstract conglomeration. (146) 
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So, when Malone relies upon socially constructed holidays or bases the passage of days 
on the alternations of sun and moon, the chronotope of the novel resists a momentless 
present. 
At the same time, the chronotope of the novel remains undefined. In fact, the 
dialectical relationships between and within time and space commented above contribute 
to the essential indeterminacy of the novel’s chronotope. Rather than delineating a 
totalizing structure for spatio-temporal relations, Malone’s constant reinterpretations and 
speculations create a number of possible chronotopal definitions, each one as valid as the 
other. The indeterminacy of this process and the impossibility of conclusion embody the 
flexible, postmodern spatiality of the text. 
 
“I Am Becoming an Island Dweller”: Foe 
Gilbert Yeoh, in his comparative study of Beckett’s Molloy and Coetzee’s The 
Life and Times of Michael K, argues that Coetzee appropriates three specific “Beckettian 
paradigms”—nothingness, minimalism, and indeterminacy—in his own text and applies 
it to a South African reality (“Nothingness” 121).20 Coetzee is remarkably adept at “using 
the strategies […] to address his own personal and historical circumstances” (136). Yeoh 
calls this adoption of the third paradigm of indeterminacy “a politics of historical 
evasion” (131). This similarity between Beckett and Coetzee extends beyond the two 
specific novels discussed in Yeoh’s essay to include the two in this study. But, whereas 
Yeoh focuses on the “historical evasion” in Michael K, I suggest that a more 
encompassing chronotopal evasion occurs in Foe. Coetzee structures Foe so that space, 
                                                 
20 For other comparative analyses of Beckett and Coetzee, see Cantor, Kellman, and Yeoh’s 
“Ethics.” 
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as well as time, resists firm definition, and the novel relies upon a politicized framework 
of empire for its specific discourse. Foe depends upon malleability and renegotiation of 
time and space. By analyzing these renegotiations, we see how Foe creates a chronotope 
that, while similar to Malone Dies, carries overtly political and politicized messages. 
Coetzee directly engages with Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Defoe’s 
biography. Foe is broken into four distinct sections. In the first, Coetzee creates the 
narrative of Susan Barton, a castaway washed onto the shore of Robinson Cruso’s21 
island, as she lives for a year on the island. The second section, written in epistolary 
format, tells of her time in England living in Daniel Foe’s22 abandoned house. The third 
section, narrated by Barton, relates her interactions with Foe in his new home. The final 
section, narrated by an ambiguous, possibly authorial voice, returns to the house years 
later. For the purpose of this chapter, analysis will focus on the first section of the book: 
Susan Barton’s arrival on Cruso’s island, her year-long stay there with Cruso and Friday, 
their rescue, and Cruso’s death aboard the rescuing ship. The latter three sections of the 
book, which contain a great deal of the novel’s self-reflexivity, will be addressed in the 
second chapter. 
In this first section, Coetzee constructs an interchronotopal dialogue amongst the 
fellow castaways. Barton finds herself on an island heavily influenced by Cruso’s societal 
definition. Throughout, she calls the island Cruso’s island, implying his ownership and 
control. She refers to herself and to Friday as “subjects” and states that Cruso “ruled over 
                                                 
21 The different spelling is Coetzee’s, though Derek Attridge points out that it is the same spelling 
as a Norwich family known by Defoe. This family was likely the source for Crusoe’s name in his novel 
(187). 
22 In 1695, Daniel Foe added the prefix “De” to his name (Shinagel 433). Both Coetzee’s Cruso 
and Foe are, then, fictional constructions informed by previous fictional and historical characterizations. 
Coetzee’s character names then contribute to the postmodern complicity and critique of his postmodern 
narrative. 
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his island” (11). For, as supreme authority, “Cruso would brook no change on his island” 
(27). He is, in her eyes, “a truly kingly figure” (37). Yet, though the island seems 
ultimately controlled by one man, even his authority becomes defined by the island itself. 
When asked by Barton if there are any laws on his island, Cruso states, “Laws are made 
for one purpose only […] to hold us in check when our desires grow immoderate. As 
long as our desires are moderate we have no need of laws” (36). Barton presses him, 
challenging that her desire to leave the island is immoderate. Cruso’s response reveals the 
role of space in his societal definitions: 
I do not wish to hear of your desire. […] It concerns other things, it does 
not concern the island, it is not a matter of the island. On the island there is 
no law except the law that we shall work for our bread, which is a 
commandment. (36) 
The island, then, serves to negate those desires that Cruso’s commandment may regulate. 
And, while Barton is ultimately dissatisfied with this explanation and looks to “certain 
laws unknown to us” or “the promptings of our hearts” for the ideal source of societal 
control (36), Cruso sees no source for society beyond the island itself. Space, then, serves 
to define society at the same time that society defines the space. Cruso’s commandment 
and geographical limitation imply a dialectic between space and society that coincides 
with Lefebvre’s basic concept that “(social) space is a (social) product.” In this case the 
social space of Cruso’s realm is a social product of his geographical boundaries. 
 With the island, Coetzee creates a clash between two different chronotopes. For 
Barton, rules and the boundaries of those rules supersede geographical space. She finds 
the origins of her ethics within ideas—whether religious or political—deriving from her 
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British culture. She claims, at one point, that she finds a sense of Providence in history 
(23). Her island chronotope rests on the presumption that there is a higher power that 
controls the actions of the world and exists beyond the spatial definitions of that world. 
Cruso, on the other hand, derives his ethics from the space of the island and from prior 
experience. For Cruso, ideas are dependent upon their existence within specific 
geographical boundaries: in this case, the shoreline of Cruso’s island. The 
interchronotopal gap between these two characters makes Cruso’s ideology 
incomprehensible to Barton. 
Cruso often visits a bluff on the island. Barton discovers that these trips are “a 
practice of losing himself in the contemplation of the wastes of water and sky” (38). She 
interprets his contemplations as his one escape from his island, for even in the way that 
he perceives time and space, this island often dominates his thinking. For Barton, 
however, such mental escape is impossible. For her, “sea and sky remained sea and sky, 
vacant and tedious” and she is incapable of loving “such emptiness” (38). In Cruso, 
Coetzee has created a character that understands, on some level, the problematic 
relationship between culture and truth. Whereas Barton still clings to a reality that exists 
beyond the structures of culture (in concepts like Providence), for Cruso such 
metaphysical notions are worthless. In Cruso, Coetzee creates a character who, through 
his stubbornness and unwillingness to look beyond the physical realm for societal 
definitions, embraces a geography similar to that of Lefebvre. Just as Lefebvre posits an 
inherent interconnectedness between definitions of space and culture, so too does Cruso 
formulate his own cultural framework in relation to his existence on the island. 
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On the island, Barton can only find one space which she may call her own: “a 
hollow in the rocks where I could lie sheltered from the wind and gaze out to the sea” 
(26). Her hollow within the occupied space of Cruso’s island is defined primarily by the 
fact that it looks outward from the island into the openness of the ocean, a space that 
remains undefined and uncontrolled by Cruso or others who would place her within their 
own frameworks. But such escapes into emptiness can only be fleeting at best, and 
Barton must always return to her existence on the island. She must rely upon Cruso’s 
island as a chronotopal axis even when escaping the spatial definitions of the island. 
Just as Barton cannot understand Cruso’s spatial justifications, she cannot 
understand his ultimate act of geographical redefinition: the terracing of the island. He 
has no seeds for planting and creates the terraces “for those who come after us and have 
the foresight to bring seed” (33). Of this task, which has required years of work by Cruso 
and Friday, Barton asks, “Is bare earth, baked by the sun and walled about, to be 
preferred to pebbles and bushes and swarms of birds?” She sees the task as a mere 
passing of time that could just as easily be replaced by “digging for gold” or “digging 
graves” (34). Yet even in this seemingly arbitrary act, the role of space within the 
chronotope of the narrative reasserts itself. Cruso’s role is that of preparer, who sees his 
responsibility as preparer of the island for future settlers (who may never come) (33). He 
spends his time in the service of space with the ultimate goal being the production of 
imperial wealth. 
This service is also a colonial endeavor, one in which Cruso changes the island to 
suit those colonizers who might come after him and plant the seeds of civilization. He 
defines the land, literally creating it in the service of his imperial vision. This preparation 
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is imperial in scope and colonial in spirit. Consider Edward Said’s statement that “as both 
geographical and cultural entities—to say nothing of historical entities—such locales, 
regions, geographical sectors as ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ are man-made” (5). Power, for 
Cruso or any colonial authority, carries with it the ability to define and manipulate the 
space. Cruso defines the island’s geography by its potential agricultural value.  
Cruso also destroys any prior spatial definitions. His and Friday’s terracing has 
literally reshaped the landscape. He has relocated an entire population of apes that once 
roamed throughout the island. After “he had killed many,” the apes were relegated to the 
North Bluff, existing in Cruso’s eyes as “a pest” (21). In Cruso, Coetzee creates a 
colonial power that enters a space and redefines it to his liking. During his indeterminate 
time on the island, Cruso makes a spatial turn that transforms the temporal into a 
peripheral element of his own narrative chronotope. Barton describes the way he tells 
stories: 
I would gladly now recount to you the history of this singular Cruso, as I 
heard it from his own lips. But the stories he told me were so various, and 
so hard to reconcile one with another, that I was more and more driven to 
conclude age and isolation had taken their toll on his memory, and he no 
longer knew for sure what was truth, what fancy. (11-12) 
Whereas one day he came from a wealthy merchant family, the next he was “a poor lad” 
captured by Moors. He claims that Friday came with him to the island as a child (12). 
Later, Cruso states that Friday was a cannibal rescued from death. He has disconnected 
himself from the passage of time so that, to use Bakhtin’s phrase, there is no moment of 
time. Each event becomes a separate thing disconnected and de-contextualized. Barton 
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recognizes an irony in this: “Growing old on his island kingdom […] has so narrowed his 
horizon—when the horizon all around us was so vast and so majestic!—that he had come 
to be persuaded he knew all there was to know about the world” (13). In Cruso’s 
chronotope, narrative time and space remain connected—if, indeed, they are connected—
by the thinnest of threads. 
The old man’s “age and isolation,” which Barton blames for his wildly varied 
stories, offer glimpses at deeper meanings in Cruso’s frayed spatio-temporal framework. 
Barton guesses him to be sixty years old (8). But it need not be age alone that causes his 
historical fluctuations. His long isolation—we are never given a specific length of time—
has separated Cruso not only from relatives and home; it has also separated him from a 
European consciousness in which history and issues of time are paramount. Hayden 
White calls the historical consciousness “a specifically western prejudice” (1). Isolated on 
his own island, where all matters of time and place remain undefined, Cruso has slowly 
slipped away from a reliance on English history. The island serves such a primary role in 
Cruso’s space-time that, when he is forced to leave it, he is unable to adjust to a new 
framework. Already sick when a ship arrives, he is incapable of recovering. The ship 
takes him “farther from the kingdom he pined for,” making him “a prisoner” on board 
(43). As “the rock of England looms closer and closer” his life wanes and, eventually 
passes (44). 
Despite Barton’s speculation on Cruso’s senility and madness, he slowly 
influences her chronotopal framework as space comes to occupy a larger share of her 
thoughts. She begins to see space as something malleable and interactive. Her spatial 
redefinition addresses the island’s very placement within the world. Barton describes the 
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island as a place that is constantly relocating itself on the globe. The ground seems to 
“sway beneath” her, like the rocking of a ship (26). Barton thinks, “It is a sign, a sign I 
am an island-dweller. I am forgetting what it is like to live on the mainland.” She, like the 
island swaying beneath her, is shifting. Coetzee alters the way that Barton interacts with 
space. At one point, she imagines the island floating on the sea: 
I stretched out my arms and laid my palms on the earth, and, yes, the 
rocking persisted, the rocking of the island as it sailed through the sea and 
the night bearing into the future its freight of gulls and sparrows and fleas 
and apes and castaways, all unconscious now, save me. (26) 
This passage of the island “into the future” connects the passage of time and space. While 
Barton, Cruso, and Friday may remain trapped, this conception of the floating island 
moving forward through time reasserts for Barton a temporal mobility that conflates with 
spatial mobility. This revision of her perceived chronotope reassures her and allow her to 
fall asleep smiling. 
Importantly, Barton contrasts this rocking of Cruso’s island with the perceived 
solidity of Britain: “They say Britain is an island too, a great island. But that is a mere 
geographer’s notion. The earth under our feet is firm in Britain, as it never was on 
Cruso’s island” (26). So, while geographers may have defined “island” as a body of land 
surrounded by water, Coetzee shows Barton attempting her own definition, one which 
goes beyond scientific measurement to include a definite social and political framework. 
On Cruso’s island, such an existence is impossible. The novel goes beyond rigid 
categorical thinking and incorporates elements beyond science and geography to redefine 
space. 
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This new conception of space does not, however, eliminate the influence of her 
traditional conception of space. Instead, her perception of the relationship between time 
and space is heavily influenced by her time away from the island. When complaining 
about the ever-present wind, Barton says, 
Very likely you will say to yourself: In Patagonia the wind blows all year 
without let, and the Patagonians do not hide their heads, so why does she? 
But the Patagonians, knowing no home but Patagonia, have no reason to 
doubt that the wind blows at all seasons without let in all quarters of the 
globe; whereas I know better. (15) 
Her knowledge of other lands informs her experience on this island. Unlike those living 
isolated on windy Patagonia, Barton’s spatializations are constantly in dialogue with the 
global spaces of imperial England. Patagonians have not had their conceptions of space 
challenged by journeys to other places or, perhaps more importantly, by stories about 
other places. By comparing her own experience to that of a Patagonian, Barton reveals 
the imperial influence upon her own spatialization. Patagonia, on the other side of the 
world from England, provides the contrast that she needs to justify her discomfort in the 
wind. Her existence on the island is informed by her existence as a subject of the British 
Empire and by the others places to which she has traveled to or heard of. 
Barton struggles against Cruso’s chronotopal framework. By comparing his 
reshaping of the land to a preparation for death, Barton mistakes Cruso’s terracing for 
mere busywork. Coetzee establishes an incongruity between Cruso’s and Barton’s 
chronotopal frameworks through her misunderstanding of the terracing. For Cruso, all 
events and actions exist in their relationship to the island, his civilization. Just as his 
35 
single law “that we shall work for our bread” finds its definition on the island, so too his 
actions relate directly to the island and its possible future inhabitants. In Barton, Coetzee 
creates a character that looks beyond the wasteland of the island. In fact, the island seems 
excluded from her chronotopal boundaries. As a woman and as Cruso’s “subject” she 
may play no part in defining the island society. So she looks outward for definition, into 
the sea and to Britain, away from the island that restricts her. 
The novel posits a chronotope of alienation as an alternative to Cruso’s colonial 
chronotope. Looking out to the sea, Barton also looks into the space between her spatial 
definitions. On the one hand, she is defined as one of Cruso’s “colonial” subjects. On the 
other, she is a citizen of England. Yet in neither definition can she find a place for self-
definition. Her alienation as a colonized woman forces her to reconfigure her own spatial 
framework. As Bill Ashcroft, et al state in their discussion of post-colonial literature, 
“The alienating process […] turned upon itself and acted to push that world through a 
kind of mental barrier into a position from which all experience could be viewed as 
uncentered, pluralistic, and multifarious” (12). Barton, like many who react to colonial 
authority, experiences a chronotope of indeterminacy that relies upon difference, 
hybridity, and indeterminacy, in an attempt to break out from Cruso’s patriarchal 
colonialism. For her, the ideal space is the one with no solid definition. When she states 
that she is becoming an island dweller, she is reevaluating her own spatiality in reaction 
to Cruso’s kind of colonialism. She begins to resist Cruso’s authoritarian definition of 
space by embracing indeterminacy. 
Cruso and Barton, while offering examples of postmodern chronotopal 
interactions, do not provide the only spatio-temporal frameworks within the novel. Most 
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interesting (and most problematic) is Cruso’s supposed servant, the apparently tongueless 
Friday.23 Having little concept of his perception of space-time, Barton’s attempts to 
understand Friday’s actions depend upon her own spatio-temporal framework. Friday 
represents an “other” whose own perceptions of time and space are both 
incomprehensible and incongruous to Barton’s own spatio-temporal framework. 
Friday’s history is left to be told by Cruso, a man who has largely abandoned 
conventional history. When asked by Barton how Friday lost his tongue, Cruso responds 
that it was removed by slavers. When Barton presses, Cruso responds: 
Perhaps the slavers who are Moors, hold the tongue to be a delicacy. […] 
Or perhaps they grew weary of listening to Friday’s wails of grief, that 
went on day and night. Perhaps they wanted to prevent him from ever 
telling his story: who he was, where his home lay, how it came about that 
he was taken. Perhaps they cut out the tongue of every cannibal they took, 
as a punishment. How will we ever know the truth? (23) 
Friday’s history is lost to Barton. There is even the possibility that Cruso, rather than 
slavers, cut out Friday’s tongue. She wonders what keeps Friday so placid and servile 
(36-37). Friday’s story cannot be pinned down and constantly shifts, much like the island 
underneath them. Both the novel’s spatial indeterminacy and its uncertainty concerning 
Friday’s background reflect the postmodern tendency to question totalizing narratives. 
Both undermine conventional means of definition, whether Barton’s conception of space 
and culture or the traditional narrative framework. 
                                                 
23 Lewis MacLeod argues that there is actually no evidence that Friday has no tongue (8). As 
proof, he points to Cruso’s unreliable stories, the fact that “it was too dark” (12) for Barton to see into 
Friday’s mouth, and her later confession that “when [Cruso] asked me to look, I would not” (85). For the 
moment, Barton’s perception of a tongueless Friday serves to support the particular argument of this study. 
The fact is that Friday cannot (or will not) tell his own history. 
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 We see this postmodern spirit when Friday paddles into the sea upon a log to lay 
“white flakes” into the water, which are later discovered to be petals (31). Barton 
speculates that “he had been making an offering of the gods to cause the fish to run 
plentiful, or performing some other such superstitious observance” (31). While Friday’s 
act cannot be fully understood, Barton interprets it as “the first sign that a spirit or soul 
[…] stirred beneath that dull and unpleasing exterior” (32). These actions give a social 
meaning to that specific space off shore. This sign of “spirit” places Friday within a 
culture and raises him from a kind of animalistic existence that Barton initially sees. His 
action, while enigmatic, is proof for Barton of a larger cultural (and chronotopal) 
framework. Barton speculates that his actions at that particular space hold some meaning 
for him, thus placing cultural value upon the location. 
 The novel establishes Barton’s inability to understand Friday’s chronotopal 
framework. So she creates one informed by her own chronotopal framework, inserting 
Friday’s actions into her providential system. In the same way that she renegotiates her 
own chronotope upon the island, she also reinterprets Friday’s actions. If, as Lefebvre 
posits, space is produced socially, then the space to which Friday paddles and lays the 
flowers is defined not only by his actions but also by Barton’s interpretation of those 
actions. Moreover, since Friday does not contribute to that interpretation except through 
the initial action, it is Barton who ultimately defines the space in her narrative. 
 In her interpretations, Barton engages in colonialism similar to Cruso’s own. Just 
as Cruso tries to dictate the definitions of the island, Barton’s narrative offers an 
interpretation of Friday’s actions. Prior to his trip on the log, she “had given to Friday’s 
life as little thought as I would have a dog’s or any other dumb beast’s” (32). Only by 
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imposing her own spatial definitions on Friday’s actions is she able to humanize him. 
Therefore, as Patrick Corcoran states, Barton “may be a victim, but the subtlety of 
Coetzee’s text is that it illustrates how victims too can simultaneously be oppressors” 
(265). Friday is just as unable to challenge her interpretations as Barton is unable to 
challenge Foe’s narrative. His silence allows for the creation of Barton’s narrative. 
For both of these novels then, there exist two important elements of chronotopal 
interaction. The first, interchronotopal interaction, engages two differing spatio-temporal 
axes in a dialectical relationship. The second, intrachronotopal interaction, involves 
renegotiation of specific spatial or temporal elements within a single chronotope. Both 
assume an inherent flexibility within and between space-time relations, and through these 
interactions the postmodern chronotope resists totalization. Admittedly, these two 
chronotopal interactions can be found throughout literature. But novels like Malone Dies 
and Foe explicitly acknowledge the indeterminate nature of these spatio-temporal 
relationships. Additionally, postmodern texts embrace a problematic self-consciousness 
that sophisticates chronotopal indeterminacies by addressing the novel’s very nature as a 
written text. These texts about the creation of text establish spatio-temporal relationships 
that reflect the creation of spatio-temporal relationships. This chronotopal self-reflexivity 
becomes the distinguishing trait of the postmodern chronotope in these two novels. 
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Chapter Two: 
Self-Reflexivity and the Postmodern Creative Chronotope 
 
 To distinguish the postmodern chronotope from the chronotopal frameworks of 
other literary styles we must go beyond spatio-temporal indeterminacy, for nearly all 
forms of narrative employ some interchronotopal or intrachronotopal dialogue. As 
Bakhtin explains, “Chronotopes are mutually inclusive, they co-exist, they may be 
interwoven with, replace or oppose one another, contradict one another or find 
themselves in ever more complex relationships” (252). All chronotopes depend upon a 
dialogical relationship for existence and definition. Indeterminacy within the chronotope 
problematizes these dialogical relationships, but does not diminish their necessity. As a 
result, the interchronotopal and intrachronotopal indeterminacies of Malone Dies and Foe 
embody the dialogical situation of space and time in each respective narrative. 
 To understand the postmodern elements employed by the two novels, we must 
examine the self-reflexivity of each text. Through hypodiegesis and diegetic reflections 
on narrative formation, these postmodern works embrace the indeterminacy of spatio-
temporal definition while at the same time critiquing the very process of chronotopal 
formation. 
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Narrated/Narrative Events: The Postmodern Creative Chronotope 
In addition to the spatio-temporal interactions that occur within and between 
individual chronotopes (intrachronotopal and interchronotopal, respectively), chronotopes 
establish fundamental relationships between texts and the worlds from which they derive. 
Both art and lived experience are informed by the same spatio-temporal framework. 
Labeling this informing process the “creative chronotope,” Bakhtin explains that 
The work and the world represented in it enter the world and enrich it, and 
the real world enters the work and its world as part of the process of its 
creation, as well as part of it subsequent life, in a continual renewing of 
the work through the creative perception of listeners and readers. Of 
course this process of exchange is itself chronotopic: it occurs first and 
foremost in the historically developing social world, but without ever 
losing contact with changing historical space. (254) 
In other words, the time-space of art and life are two different but interdependent levels 
of dialogue. This creative chronotope informs issues of time and space for both the novel 
and its represented world. Michael Holquist offers an analogy: “when I am in the kitchen 
I am not in the bedroom but nevertheless I am still in the same house” (111). The 
house—or the creative chronotope—serves as the organizing center for establishing 
definitions of and relationships between the different rooms—or the dialogically related 
chronotopes of art and life. 
Within these various dialogues of time and space, Bakhtin identifies a number of 
specific chronotopes. He mentions, for example, the chronotope of parlors and salons in 
the realist novels of Stendhal and Balzac (246). In these spaces “the epoch [of nineteenth-
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century realism] becomes not only graphically visible [space], but narratively visible 
[time]” (247). He also discusses the chronotopes of the road, the provincial town, and the 
castle that, among others, become “the organizing centers for the fundamental narrative 
events of the novel” (250). But, in the postmodern novel, the possibility of maintaining 
an “organizing center” becomes problematic. If the spatio-temporal center is undermined 
and made epistemologically problematic, then chronotopal definition appears to be 
difficult, if not impossible. 
To allow for such an indeterminacy to exist within a narrative there must be a 
constant renegotiation of the chronotopal boundaries of that narrative, both within the 
text itself and externally by the writer (and later by the reader). Bakhtin explains: 
Before us are two events—the event that is narrated in the work and the 
event of narration itself […]; these events take place in different times […] 
and in different places, but at the same time these two events are 
indissolubly united in a single but complex event that we might call the 
work in the totality of all its events, including the external material 
givenness of the work, and its text, and the world represented in the text, 
and the author-creator and the listener or reader; thus we perceive the 
fullness of the work in all its wholeness and indivisibility, but at the same 
time we understand the diversity of the elements that constitute it. (255) 
In other words, our understanding of a text is predicated on our understanding of its 
fragmentary nature. Postmodern narratives often recognize this chronotopal 
fragmentation. Whereas other narratives may include dialogues within and between 
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chronotopes, postmodern narratives occasionally make these dialogues the narrative 
itself, self-reflexively informing the process of chronotopal definition. 
Many postmodern narratives self-reflexively address this dilemma of chronotopal 
definition. Robert Siegle claims that self-reflexive texts derive authority from “the codes 
by which we organize reality, the means by which we organize words about it into 
narrative, […] and the nature of our relation to ‘actual’ stages of reality” (3). Shlomith 
Rimmon-Kenan acknowledges that “self-conscious texts often play with narrative levels 
in order to question the borderline between reality and fiction or to suggest that there may 
be no reality apart from its narration” (94). Both seem to argue that self-reflexivity 
clarifies the inherent separation between representation and reality while also positing an 
overarching framework that defines both. 
In many self-reflexive postmodern texts, the organizing center of the creative 
chronotope is found within the text itself. If, as Holquist contends, “the time/space 
relation of any particular text will always be perceived in the context of a larger set of 
time/space relations that [are obtained] in the social and historical environment in which 
it is read” (141), then the self-reflexive chronotope also finds those larger relations within 
the text itself. Definitions of and relationships between time and space within 
postmodern, self-reflexive texts derive from narrative creation. In the postmodern 
creative chronotope, time and space become points of conflict within this creative 
process. If we think of this in terms of Linda Hutcheon’s ideas of postmodernism, the 
postmodern creative chronotope embodies the “complicitous critique” that “involves a 
paradoxical installing as well as subverting of conventions” (13), using the dialogic 
43 
process of chronotopal formation and definition to challenge the potential for its 
totalization. 
An extended revision of Holquist’s house analogy offers an explanation. Rather 
than simply declaring “I am in the bedroom and not in the kitchen,” the postmodern 
creative chronotope challenges the definitions of these specific rooms and, more 
importantly, the very concept of “room.” It may move the oven into the closet or place 
the mattress in the garage. It may remove a wall from the bedroom, connecting it to the 
den. While I am still in the house, the postmodern creative chronotope constantly 
questions and problematizes the relationships between those things within the house. It 
asks the questions, “How do I know that I am in the bedroom? What makes this room the 
‘bedroom?’” And while it may provide no answer, the act of questioning reveals the 
social and historical construction of both the house and the rooms within the house. In the 
postmodern creative chronotope, then, chronotopes are defined by their complex 
dialogical relationships to one another, which, paradoxically, resists definition. 
In the postmodern creative chronotope, then, external and internal chronotopes are 
defined by their dialogical relationship to one another. These self-reflexive discussions of 
space and time exist throughout Malone Dies and Foe. Their hypodiegesis or diegetic 
discussions of narrative formation self-reflexively address the process of chronotopal 
definition. 
 
“I Shall Tell Myself Stories”: Self-Reflexivity in Malone Dies 
In “Three Novels and Four Nouvelles: Giving up the Ghost Be Born at Last,” Paul 
Davies discusses the way that Samuel Beckett’s works  
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confront a civilization which is the theatre of […] a conflict between two 
powerful forces. One is the rational(izing) principle, cogito, abstract 
reasoning, the conscious mind, will and design, determinism, positivism, 
the imposition of extrinsic order. […] Beneath, above and against this 
force, is the opposite force, often hidden, as yet inaccessible to conscious 
will: a sense of the primordial spring of life, which does not respond to 
analysis. (43). 
As he proceeds to explain, this distinction between conflicting epistemological 
frameworks is revealed in the language of Malone Dies. “The language of Beckett’s 
novels,” Davies explains, “reflects, as it tells, on the means of telling” (58). What it finds: 
“all descriptions are misdescriptions” (Davies 59).24 The indeterminacy of narrative 
manifests itself in the very language of Beckett’s novels, including Malone Dies. Davies’ 
argument closely aligns with my own conception of the postmodern creative chronotope, 
and by analyzing the relationship between indeterminacy in the spatio-temporal 
frameworks of Malone’s hypodiegetic narratives, we see that Beckett’s confrontation 
with “the ‘scientific’ concept of the universe as a mechanism” (Davies 43) becomes self-
reflexive. 
Near the beginning of the novel, Malone states his narrative intentions: 
While waiting I shall tell myself stories, if I can. They will not be the same 
kind of stories as hitherto, that is all. They will be neither beautiful nor 
ugly, they will be calm, there will be no ugliness or beauty or fever in 
them any more, they will be almost lifeless, like the teller. What was that I 
                                                 
24 Beckett concisely expresses this in Worstword Ho, where the narrator proclaims, “Said is 
missaid” (113). 
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said? It does not matter. I look forward to their giving me great 
satisfaction, some satisfaction. (180) 
Even in this intentional statement, Malone’s hypodiegesis (and its corresponding 
chronotope) begins to falter. He questions his intentions (“What was that I said?”) and, by 
linking his near lifelessness with the lifelessness of his narrative, begins the connection 
between diegesis and hypodiegesis that continues through the novel. 
Having tentatively declared his narrative purpose, Malone formulates a plan—a 
“time-table”—for the creation of his stories. His initial intention—to create a story “about 
a man, another about a woman, a third about a thing and finally one about an animal” 
(181)—establishes very distinct chronotopal boundaries for each tale. But his time-table 
changes soon after its inception. He merges the tale of the man with that of the woman. 
He adds a discussion of his present state and of his inventory. Then their narrative order 
bothers him. He asks, aware of his impending death, “Would it not be better for me to 
speak of my possessions without further delay?” Yet, even in his affirmation of this plan 
(“There it is then divided into five” [182]) his narrative plan falters: 
To return to the five [stories]. Present state, three stories, inventory, there. 
An occasional interlude is to be feared. A full programme. I shall not 
deviate from it any further than I must. So much for that. I feel I am 
making a great mistake. No matter. 
Malone begins what comes to be a constant renegotiation of temporal and spatial 
definitions throughout his hypodiegetic narrative. 
The chronotope of his own life (the novel’s diegetic chronotope) interacts and 
alters the chronotope of his writing (the novel’s hypodiegetic chronotope). Malone must 
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shape his stories so that they fit into the remaining time in his life. And, like all guesses at 
one’s death, the exact length of time remains indeterminate. Simon Critchley states that 
“Malone Dies takes place in the impossible time of dying, and it is into this ungraspable 
temporal stretch that the voice gives itself the possibility of telling stories” (119). That 
the specific moment of Malone’s death remains ungraspable means that his hypodiegetic 
narrative—the only chronotopal structure over which he has any (partial) control—
“continually breaks down into an unnarratable impossibility” (Critchley 119). The 
chronotopal relationship between art and life (between Malone’s stories and his 
existence) disintegrates. Narration becomes impossible because chronotopal definition 
becomes equally impossible. Malone finds himself constantly shifting the narrative 
chronotope to coincide with the current temporal conception of his existence. He often 
hurries his narratives along (“I told myself too that I must make better speed” [197], “I 
hasten to turn aside from this extraordinary heat” [259]) in order to allow for the end of 
his narratives (and their chronotopal boundaries) to coincide with his own life (and its 
chronotopal boundaries). 
Renegotiations of these hypodiegetic chronotopes serve as self-reflexive 
dialogues on the nature of time and space in narrative formation. Despite all attempts, 
Malone’s hypodiegetic narrative fails to maintain the “paradigmatic closure and rigidly 
categorical thinking” that Soja argues is embodied in modernist thinking (73). Closure, 
for Malone, comes only in death, and this closure is ultimately unknowable. Malone’s 
inability to know what he does, where he does it, or if he even exists is reflected in his 
inability to define an absolute chronotope for his stories. The ways that time and place 
constantly shift throughout them mimic the chronotopal negotiations that result from the 
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indeterminacy of his own time and space (that is, the indeterminacy of the diegetic 
chronotope). Chronotopal dialogue, then, becomes a continuous and necessary part of his 
creative act. 
Within Malone’s tales, characters are often unaware of their surroundings. For 
example, when describing the locale Malone states, “[Macmann] did not know quite 
where he was” (240). When attempting to pinpoint the season for his story of Macmann, 
Malone writes, 
For Macmann […] it is a true spring evening, an equinoctial gale howls 
along the quays bordered by high red houses, many of which are 
warehouses. Or it is perhaps an evening in autumn and these leaves 
whirling in the air, whence it is impossible to say, for here there are no 
trees, are perhaps no longer the first of the year, barely green, but old 
leaves that have known the long joys of summer and now are good for 
nothing but to lie rotting in a heap. (231) 
The physical markers of place become markers for time in Malone’s hypodiegesis. 
Macmann’s (and Malone’s, as narrator) inability to pinpoint the season comes from the 
fact that there are no trees with leaves that change colors or flower at the appropriate 
times to serve as markers for the passing year. 
At one point, Malone describes the grounds of Macmann’s asylum, the House of 
Saint John of God, as “a genuine English park, though far from England, […] the trees at 
war with one another, and the bushes, and the wild flowers and weeds, all ravening for 
earth and light” (275). But he then hesitates and declares, “Let us try it another way” 
(277), and it becomes a “great mound with gentle slopes” lashed by wind that “blew 
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almost without ceasing.” He revises the geography of his hypodiegetic narrative in much 
the same way that he shifts his speculations on his own location. 
This shifting of space coincides with critical observations of temporal instability 
within similar texts. In his study of diary novels, H. Porter Abbott addresses the 
relationship between Malone Dies and three traditional topoi of diary fiction. For Abbott, 
Beckett accentuates one of these topoi in his novel: the merging of “the time of the 
narrating and the time of the narrated” (189), by having Malone “aspire hopelessly to the 
condition of the omniscient and omnipotent artist” (190). Abbott goes further: 
Malone draws on what remains of the left lobe of his brain to fulfill the 
requirements of a plan […], a plan which, as we know, begins to fall into 
ruin the moment it is formulated. His stories are swamped by his present 
state; time lies heavily on the notebook. (190) 
In other words, the time of Malone’s stories (the hypodiegetic narratives) and the time of 
Malone’s existence reflect upon one another and, in some instances, appear to conflate. I 
want to expand Abbott’s claim by relating it to the creative chronotope. If we can accept 
that Malone Dies addresses the relationship between narrating and narrated times, then it 
follows that narrating and narrated spaces also affect the work. If “time lies heavily on 
the notebook,” so too does space. 
Importantly, these spatio-temporal instabilities often mirror the diegetic narrative. 
When Malone writes, “This is the kind of story [Macmann] has been telling himself all of 
his life, saying, This cannot possibly last much longer” (239), his hypodiegetic narrative 
reflects the opening sentence of the novel: “I shall soon be quite dead at last in spite of 
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all” (179). Neither Macmann nor Malone can pinpoint the exact moment of ending. This 
mise en abyme occurs elsewhere as well. Discussing Sapo’s work ethic, Malone states, 
To stop in the middle of a tedious and perhaps futile task was something 
that Sapo could readily understand. For a great number of tasks are of this 
kind, without a doubt, and the only way to end them is to abandon them” 
(214). 
Compare this to Malone’s many interruptions throughout his narrative, despite his 
insistence on continuing. 
The reflexivity is also spatial. Both Malone and Macmann find themselves in 
enclosed spaces. Just as Malone is enclosed in his room, “naked in the bed, in the 
blankets, whose numbers I increase and diminish as the seasons come and go” (185), so 
Macmann finds himself similarly confined, “in a kind of asylum” (255). Of Macmann’s 
asylum, Malone writes, 
But the space hemmed him in on every side and held him in its toils, with 
the multitude of other faintly stirring, faintly struggling things, such as the 
children, the lodges and the gates, and like a sweat of things the moments 
streamed away in a great chaotic conflux of oozings and torrents, and the 
trapped huddled things changed and died each one according to its 
solitude. (278) 
For both Malone and Macmann, the isolation within their respective enclosures coincides 
with a temporal wasting away. Malone’s stories of Sapo and Macmann, written in his 
exercise-book, reflect upon his own situation. He wants to “make a little creature […] in 
my image” which, after “seeing what a poor thing I have made, or how like myself, I 
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shall eat it” (226). Malone will destroy his creations, his self-images, just as he (Beckett’s 
fictional creation) will be destroyed, as the title of the novel implies. 
However, his desire to devour his own creations proves futile. The self-reflexivity 
of Malone’s hypodiegetic narrative is made apparent when he states, 
With my distant hand I count the pages that remain. They will do. This 
exercise-book is my life, this child’s exercise-book, it has taken me a long 
time to resign myself to that. And yet I shall not throw it away. For I want 
to put down in it, for the last time, those I have called to my help, but ill, 
so that they did not understand, so that they may cease with me. (274, 
italics added) 
Malone understands that his hypodiegetic stories will end with his life. Both are dictated 
by the spatio-temporal relationship that exists between art and life within the creative 
chronotope. In this case, however, Malone’s life (Beckett’s diegetic narrative) is art or, 
more specifically, text. The chronotopal dialogue between diegesis and hypodiegesis 
accentuates this textuality and reveals its own problematic nature as text. What results 
from this self-reflexivity is an indeterminism that addresses the very nature of artistic 
creation. Subversions of the spatial and temporal structure of Malone’s hypodiegetic 
narrative reflect upon the subversions that occur throughout the diegetic narrative. The 
postmodern creative chronotope takes shape in the relationship between these two levels 
of chronotopal indeterminacy. 
At the end of the novel, just before Malone’s final descent into the hypodiegetic 
narrative, he writes, “The render rent. My story ended I’ll be living yet. Promising lag. 
That is the end of me. I shall say no more” (283). Here, Beckett directly juxtaposes 
51 
Malone—moments away from passing—and his own spatio-temporal existence with that 
of his stories. His contention that he will live on beyond his stories is immediately 
denied. He—his chronotope—is subsumed into his own narrative. 
 Simon Critchley argues that Malone “tries to silence the emptiness by telling 
stories but only succeeds in letting the emptiness speak as the stories break down into 
mortal tedium” (120). Similarly, Ulrika Maude sees the subversion of cultural codes 
which, in turn, “exposes the discursive nature of the code” (76). Perhaps Beckett’s novel 
summarizes this point best when Malone states, “my notes have a curious tendency, as I 
realize at last, to annihilate all they purport to record” (259). The dialogic interchange 
between and within the indeterminate chronotopes of both Malone’s life and his narrative 
ultimately reflects upon the impossibility of narrative specificity and definition in regards 
to time and space. 
 
“The Island Is Not a Story”: Foe’s Politicized Creative Chronotope 
A similar chronotopal dialogue can be found throughout the work of J. M. 
Coetzee. Coetzee, however, explicitly acknowledges the political origins and 
consequences of this dialogue. In his 2003 Nobel lecture, “He and His Man,” J. M. 
Coetzee recreates Robinson Crusoe as a man who has returned from his desert island to 
rest in Bristol. This Crusoe reflects upon the story of his survival and escape from the 
island and its influence on others: 
When the first bands of plagiarists and imitators descended upon his island 
history and foisted on the public their own feigned stories of the castaway 
life, they seemed to him no more or less than a horde of cannibals falling 
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upon his own flesh, that is to say, his life; and he did not scruple to say 
so…But now, reflecting further, there begins to creep into his breast a 
touch of fellow-feeling for his imitators. For it seems to him now that 
there are but a handful of stories in the world; and if the young are to be 
forbidden to prey upon the old then they must sit for ever in silence. 
The necessary plagiarism of these “imitators” connects their act of thievery to Crusoe’s 
story. Crusoe—Defoe’s fictional character, inspired by the historical castaway tales of 
Alexander Selkirk and others—calls these imitations “feigned stories” and challenges the 
idea of narrative origin. If all narratives mimic “a handful of stories,” then the differences 
lie in the ways that they mimic and the purposes behind those acts of mimicry. Their 
discourses are informed (though not dictated) by the time and place of the originary text. 
Contemporary texts that return to these “handful of stories” are often informed by 
issues of postmodernism and, with narratives like Robinson Crusoe, post-colonialism. 
Bill Ashcroft, in The Empire Writes Back, attempts to distinguish the post in post-
colonialism and postmodernism. Using Anthony Kwame Appiah’s statement that “the 
post in post-colonial, like the post in postmodernism, is the post of the space-clearing 
gesture,” Ashcroft claims that the distinction “lies in the fact that [the two terms] are 
both, in their very different and culturally located ways, discursive elaborations of Post-
modernity” (208). Post-colonial culture, for Ashcroft, is “a hybridized phenomenon 
involving a dialectical relationship between the ‘grafted’ European cultural systems and 
an indigenous ontology” (220). The interaction and reformation of these two different 
cultural influences into unique post-colonial cultures demand that literature and literary 
studies take this localization into account. Lyotard’s claim that postmodernism maintains 
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an “incredulity toward metanarratives” would initially seem to affirm the localization that 
occurs in the hybridized cultures of post-colonialism. 
But such a conflation is problematic, at best. John Thieme emphasizes a twofold 
approach when analyzing texts that write back to the canon (what he calls “con-texts”), 
calling for a localized analysis of a work and then a placement of that regionally specific 
text into a comparative relationship with other texts from other regions (7). Similarly, 
Ashcroft cautions against compartmentalizing post-colonial theory by arguing that such 
theoretical segregation only “contradicts the capacity of post-colonial theories to 
demonstrate the complexity of the operation of imperial discourse” (200). For both, there 
is a need to understand the localization implicit in post-colonial literature at the same 
time that one considers its global relationship. 
Admittedly, the distinction between postmodern and post-colonial is unclear, and 
their influence upon one another is unmistakable. Grounded in European textuality and 
informed by the process of colonialism, Foe self-reflexively addresses the relationship 
between post-colonialism and postmodernism, challenging Ashcroft’s attempt at 
separation. Through his novel’s self-reflexive narrative discourse and appropriation of 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Coetzee addresses the politics implicit in narrative production, 
something that is made explicit in the novel’s narrative space and time. His imitation, in 
other words, employs a kind of postmodern creative chronotope, one similar to Beckett’s 
in Malone Dies but additionally informed by overtly political issues. 
A number of critics have acknowledged the intertextuality invested in most, if not 
all, of Coetzee’s writing. Derek Attridge argues that Coetzee’s works “appear to locate 
themselves within an established literary culture, rather than presenting themselves as an 
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assault on that culture” via an “over allusiveness” (169).25 Lewis MacLeod states that 
Coetzee writes novels that are “politically resonant, stylistically dense, and explicitly 
intertextual” (1). In Foe, this intertextuality becomes a fundamental principle, as Coetzee 
directly engages and appropriates both the novel Robinson Crusoe and Daniel Defoe’s 
biography.26 Inserting a female narrator who is washed upon the shore of Cruso’s island, 
the novel recounts her time on the island, her rescue and return to England, and her 
attempt to have the story of her time on the island written down. 
Coetzee’s reflection upon previously constructed texts is a typical strategy of 
postmodern artists. Hutcheon’s discussion of this strategy within postmodern 
photography informs Coetzee’s own textual strategy in Foe: 
Reappropriating existing representations that are effective precisely 
because they are loaded with pre-existing meaning and putting them into 
new and ironic contexts is a typical form of postmodern photographic 
critique: while exploiting the power of familiar images, it also de-
naturalizes them, makes visible the concealed mechanisms which work to 
make them seem transparent, and brings to the fore their politics, that is to 
say, the interests in which they operate and the power they wield. (42) 
                                                 
25 Attridge offers a list of allusions that occur throughout Coetzee’s works, from Waiting for the 
Barbarians and its references to a Cavafy poem and Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, to the Life and 
Times of Michael K and its connections to the works of Franz Kafka (169). 
26 For other references to Robinson Crusoe, see Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello (2003), in which one 
character observes, “Supply the particulars, allow the significations to emerge of themselves. A procedure 
pioneered by Daniel Defoe. Robinson Crusoe, cast up on the beach, looks around for his shipmates. But 
there are none. ‘I never saw them afterwards, or any sign of them,’ says he, ‘except three of their hats, one 
cap, and two shoes that were not fellows.’…No large words, no despair, just hats and caps and shoes” (4). 
This statement mirrors a passage from Coetzee’s essay about Defoe’s novel, where he states that Defoe’s 
“method of bald empirical description works wonderfully” and then quotes the same passage (“Daniel 
Defoe” 20). Most recently, Slow Man (2005) contains a passage in which the isolated main character 
declares, “I have all the friends I could wish for…I am not Robinson Crusoe. I just do not want to see any 
of them” (14). 
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It is a small step to see the way that Foe employs similar strategies. Just as postmodern 
photography re-uses prior images to acknowledge the politics of creation, so too does 
Coetzee’s text. 
Coetzee uses a variety of appropriations to reveal these politics, referring to 
elements of Defoe’s biography and bibliography throughout the text. Daniel Foe, the 
novel’s fictional recreation of the historical Daniel Defoe, relates a convicted woman 
who closely resembles the eponymous character of Defoe’s novel, Moll Flanders (123-
24). It also mentions Defoe’s short story “A Relation of the Apparition of Mrs. Veal” 
(58). Foe’s abandonment of his house to escape arrest parallels Defoe’s many arrests for 
debt and political writing in 1713 and 1714 (Shinagel 434). By applying these and other 
biographical and bibliographical elements within a work of fiction that responds to one of 
Defoe’s own texts, Foe clarifies the gap between the two levels of the creative 
chronotope (the authorial and textual worlds) at the same time that it problematizes that 
gap. 
Coetzee’s appropriation of Defoe’s novel Robinson Crusoe is even more 
problematic. The most basic narrative element—an English castaway on an island, living 
with his non-white companion—remains the same. But, beyond this basic structure, 
Coetzee undermines much of Defoe’s text. In the original, the island is rich with wildlife. 
There are goats that Crusoe tames, grapes that he harvests, and trees for lumber. 
Conversely, the island in Coetzee’s novel is a wasteland. Its wildlife consists of ants, 
lizards, large flocks of birds, and apes; the landscape is barren, save for “drab bushes that 
never flowered and never shed their leaves” (7); and the daily pattern of “wind, rain, 
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wind, rain” never stops (14). Coetzee constructs an island devoid of splendor, quite 
different from the Caribbean paradise of the original text. 
On this desolate rock, Coetzee’s Cruso challenges the pragmatic imperialism at 
the heart of Defoe’s novel. Whereas Crusoe maintains a constructive livelihood, Cruso 
spends his days terracing the hills in preparation for future settlers who may never come. 
In the eighteenth-century text, Crusoe recovers tools and materials from the shipwreck. In 
the contemporary retelling, Cruso has none save those that he constructs. The earlier 
Crusoe builds a home with a series of living quarters, storage areas, planting fields, and 
animal pens. The twentieth-century recreation, on the other hand, maintains a paltry 
triangular habitation with a lean-to hut and a patch of “wild bitter lettuce” (9). By the end 
of his stay, Crusoe establishes a diverse agriculture. Cruso and his companions, on the 
other hand, eat only lettuce, fish, and bird’s eggs. 
These challenges to Defoe’s original novel illuminate the role of the eighteenth-
century author—and his political and ideological intentions—within the creative act. 
While Coetzee’s Cruso may see himself as a colonial figure, establishing a livable space 
through his terracing, the basic geography of his space—created by Coetzee and barren 
when compared to Defoe’s original story—make his actions seem fairly futile. Coetzee 
shows that space—and authorial investment within that space—serves as a political tool 
for Defoe. For a narrative of pragmatic imperialism, Defoe creates a space in which 
Crusoe’s imperial flourishes. Coetzee constructs a barren space, thus pulling back the 
curtain on this necessary authorial manipulation. 
Coetzee’s challenge to Friday’s characterization also reveals this spatial 
management. In Defoe’s novel, Friday is an indigenous Caribbean with hair that is “long 
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and black, not curl’d like Wool” and skin that is “a bright kind of dun olive Colour” (148-
49). In Coetzee’s appropriation, however, Friday is African. Barton calls him “a Negro 
with a head of fuzzy wool” (5). In the 1719 text, Friday’s Caribbean origins allow for the 
narrative of a savage who is civilized through Crusoe’s Anglo-Christian endeavors. 
Friday’s geographical origins contribute to the political ideology of the novel’s 
chronotope. By transforming him from an isolated Caribbean27 to an enslaved African, 
Coetzee taints him (and the chronotope) with one the more barbarous effects of 
colonialism. Changing Friday’s geographical origins shifts his particular history. Rather 
than existing in Eurocentric prehistory until his encounter with Crusoe, Coetzee’s Friday 
has a history of oppression, enslavement, and subjugation, all the result of European 
interaction. 
Additionally, Defoe’s Friday speaks throughout. Initially speaking a language 
incomprehensible to Crusoe (147), he eventually speaks a Pidgin English (his first word, 
after his given name, is “Master” [149]). The Friday in Coetzee’s narrative never speaks. 
Cruso says that he has no tongue and, moreover, has “no need of words” (56). Friday 
only reacts to basic notions, like “firewood” (21), quite different from the Friday of the 
earlier text, who engages Crusoe in a theological discussion of the relationship between 
God and the Devil (157-58). 
All of these discontinuities challenge the British, Christian imperialism of the 
original text. At every turn Foe undermines Cruso’s ability to transform the island (and 
Friday) into miniature manifestations of England. If not the barren island, then Cruso’s 
lethargy and unwillingness to participate in any sort of imperial endeavor makes such 
                                                 
27 Friday does mention an encounter with some Europeans in his homeland (161). In these 
encounters, however, the sailors attempt no colonization or “civilization.” In fact, Friday tells Crusoe that 
his people “make brother with them.” 
58 
activities difficult. The transformation of Friday from a native Caribbean into an African 
slave who has suffered from the worst aspects of European colonialism also challenges 
the missionary zeal of the 1719 narrative. 
At this authorial level, Coetzee’s novel writes back to Defoe and the imperial 
center, while further complicating the discussion on another level of chronotopal 
appropriation. Barton, on arriving in England, hires an author to write her story. She is 
very specific about what that story will be: “The history of our time on the island” (47). 
Daniel Foe,28 the author whom she has hired, insists on knowing other aspects of her 
story: Barton’s search for her lost daughter and the time that she spends in Bahia. Even 
when Barton declares that “Bahia is not a part of my story” (114), Foe pushes. Her story 
begins as Coetzee’s novel begins, with her falling from her boat into the ocean and 
arriving on Cruso’s island. For Foe, it begins elsewhere: 
The story begins in London. Your daughter is abducted or elopes, I do 
not know which, it does not matter. In quest of her you sail to Bahia, for 
you have intelligence that she is there. In Bahia you spend no less than 
two years, two fruitless years. (116) 
He then explains how her daughter heads to Bahia, returns to Europe, “haunts the docks 
of Lisbon and Oporto,” hears of rumors, returns to England, and finds her mother. 
Here, the narrative struggle again revolves around chronotopal issues. Barton has 
prioritized her time on the island. For Foe, however, Barton’s desired chronotope is a 
narrative black hole. In his words, “the island is not a story in itself” (117). It is a 
“novelty,” a middle “adventure.” Foe and Barton have defined the space and time of their 
respective narratives in ways that cannot coexist. Whereas Barton establishes her 
                                                 
28 In 1695, the historical Daniel Foe added the prefix “De” to his name (Shinagel 433). 
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narrative space within the confines of Cruso’s desert island, Foe incorporates everything 
but the island. 
As final author of Barton’s tale, Foe’s appropriation, much like Coetzee’s own 
appropriation of Defoe’s biography, ultimately dictates the nature of the chronotope. Just 
as Coetzee decides which elements of Defoe’s life to include and which to eliminate or 
alter, so too Foe manipulates and ultimately eliminates Barton from her own narrative, 
relegating her to a story that she never wanted told. English colonialism, Protestantism, 
and paternalism all affect the way that he dictates time and space so that Barton is 
removed from the island while Robinson Cruso (the English colonial force) and Friday 
(the “savage,” colonized subject) remain. For Richard Lane, Foe’s narrative usurpation is 
“paradigmatic of colonial appropriation and mastery of the Other” (106). By limiting the 
story to this geographical space, Foe is able to control its ideological elements, becoming 
the narrative master. 
These authorial and diegetic struggles between conflicting chronotopes reflect the 
dialogic nature of all chronotopes. Linda Hutcheon argues that, as we read Coetzee’s text, 
“we separate what we know of the history of the writing of Defoe’s novel […] from what 
Coetzee offers as the (fictionally) real—but absented and silenced—female origin of the 
story,” which has “something to say about the position of women and the politics of 
representation in both the fiction and the nonfiction of the eighteenth century” (73). I 
want to go further and argue that Foe’s issues, while historically situated in the 
eighteenth century, are not necessarily reflective of just that specific time. Furthermore, 
Foe addresses more than just the position of women in narrative formation if we consider 
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Barton’s own narrative usurpation of Friday. Instead, Coetzee’s novel reveals the 
necessary silencing in all storytelling. 
The final section of the novel turns this authorial appropriation back upon the 
implied author and, ultimately, the reader. In it, an unnamed first-person narrator returns 
twice to Foe’s house, once while the characters still inhabit it, the other a visit from the 
late twentieth century, contemporary (and perhaps parallel) to Coetzee’s production of 
Foe. This second visit returns us, as well, to the island. More specifically, the narrator 
enters the underwater realm and the wrecked ship below the scattered petals that so 
bedevil Barton’s interpretation of Friday. Friday is there and the narrator asks him, “What 
is this ship?” But, as the narrator explains, “this is not a place of words. Each syllable, as 
it comes out, is caught and filled with water and diffused. This is a place where bodies 
are their own signs. It is the home of Friday” (157). Even when Friday opens his mouth, 
all that comes forth is “a slow stream, without breath, without interruption.” His silence, 
then, resists all appropriations, even those of the author and the reader. Since we may 
only feel Friday’s “dark and unending” breath and can hear nothing, we are restricted 
from knowing and appropriating his tale. In the unnamed narrator’s prying open of 
Friday’s jaw to find only silence, we see Foe’s ultimate resistance to the totalized 
narrative. Because of his silence, Friday’s narrative can never be truly understood; it can 
only be created again. His silence creates a narrative gap that Barton, the final narrator, 
and the reader can never cross. In Friday’s world, “where bodies are their own signs,” his 
narrative retains its independence and avoids chronotopal appropriation. 
By appropriating a canonical text, Coetzee reveals the politics of appropriation 
and canonization. Self-reflexive and indeterminate struggles for definitions of time and 
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space inform these narrative usurpations. In them, we see what Attridge, in his discussion 
of Foe, calls “an attempt to break the silence in which so many are caught […] by literary 
means that traditionally have been celebrated as characterizing canonic art” (171). By 
doing so, Foe addresses the literary nature of this appropriation through specific political 
issues of gender, race, and empire. Benita Parry argues that, in Coetzee’s 
“renarrativation,” the European center maintains authorial power despite the questioning 
of that power, thereby “sustaining the West as the culture of reference” (40). In 
Hutcheon’s terms, we can say that Foe “exploits and yet simultaneously calls into 
question notions of closure, totalization, and universality that are part of those challenged 
grand narratives” of modernity that began with eighteenth-century enlightenment (67). 
The novel employs the post-colonial strategy of writing back to discuss the nature of 
narrative construction, an activity that is specifically postmodern. 
 
Implementing a unified narrative chronotope relies upon silencing specific 
dialogical elements or rigid categorization of these various elements. The postmodern 
text denies both of these narrative controls. Instead, texts like Malone Dies and Foe 
attempt to create narratives that exist within the dialogical process. They are novels about 
the formation of novels. More specifically, both texts self-reflexively address the role of 
space and time within the establishment of narrative.  
Malone Dies largely addresses these concerns in regards to the formation of 
biography, the relationship between diegesis and hypodiegesis, and the inevitable 
inability to establish a determinate chronotope for narrative. Its self-reflexivity, from 
diegetic to hypodiegetic narrative, employs the indeterminacy implicit in the postmodern 
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chronotope as a tool for raising these narrative concerns. Similarly, Foe addresses the 
relationship between various textual levels. Its chronotopal dialogue between characters 
within the text and Daniel Defoe’s originary work politicizes the discussion of time and 
space. Additionally, Foe inserts issues of gender and colonialism into the narrative 
process. In both Beckett’s and Coetzee’s work, the self-reflexivities establish—in 
different, yet complementary, manners—chronotopes that address the establishment of 
chronotopes. 
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Conclusion: 
Postmodern Chronotopal Imitation 
 
Both Malone Dies and Foe clarify spatio-temporal issues of postmodernism, 
particularly the nature of chronotopal dialogue within narrative. They challenge the way 
that narratives develop relationships within and between dialogical definitions of space 
and time. Each offers a nuanced discussion of the chronotopal process and uses 
indeterminacy and self-reflexivity to establish a postmodern creative chronotope. 
These postmodern creative chronotopes remain actively engaged in the processes 
that they challenge, something that Lyotard does not acknowledge in his own theories of 
postmodernism. Nevertheless, he offers an initial definition of the postmodern artist that, 
when expanded by Hutcheon, helps us to understand another chronotopal relationship 
between Malone Dies and Foe. He observes, 
the text [the postmodern artist] writes, the work he produces are not in 
principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged 
according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to 
the text or to the work. The artist and the writer, then, are working without 
rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done. (81) 
In other words, for Lyotard the traditional paradigms and categories, having been 
undermined by postmodernism’s incredulity to totalizing frameworks, no longer function 
for the postmodern artist. Instead, this artist must establish new rules. 
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Hutcheon argues that Lyotard and other postmodern theorists are “deeply—and 
knowingly—implicated in that notion of the center they attempt to subvert” (14). That is, 
postmodern theorists and postmodern artists establish their own creative frameworks 
while still influenced by the metanarratives that they challenge. Novels like Malone Dies 
and Foe further complicate Lyotard’s postmodern incredulity. They simultaneously 
employ and challenge the process of chronotopal formation. This combination of 
complicity and critique does not disengage the postmodern from the totalizing process; 
instead, it provides texts with complicated and self-reflexive means for questioning the 
aesthetic and political underpinnings in all narrative chronotopes, even their own. 
Lyotard contends that postmodernism “refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable” (xxv). Both of these texts show 
that individual investment and reevaluation of prior chronotopal frameworks are a 
necessary part of this postmodern refinement. These reevaluations make possible the idea 
that exact definitions of space and time are not necessary. In fact, they emphasize that 
such unchanging definitions are ultimately impossible. 
Coetzee’s Nobel lecture, mentioned in the previous chapter, reveals an additional 
level of complicity for comparison of these two postmodern authors. He claims that 
“there are but a handful of stories in the world; and if the young are to be forbidden to 
prey upon the old then they must sit for ever in silence” and calls all who engage in such 
retellings “plagiarists and imitators.” Importantly, Coetzee includes himself among these 
authors who must retell the old stories, since Foe is, at its most elemental, an imitation of 
Defoe’s eighteenth-century novel. Coetzee makes use of the same characters, reapplying 
Cruso(e) and Friday, though changing them in significant ways. He places them upon a 
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desert island that, while not a direct reflection of the eighteenth-century location, refers 
back to that place. Because of these narrative imitations, Foe’s chronotopal implications 
cannot be fully grasped without understanding the novel’s relationship to Defoe’s 
original narrative. 
Just as important as these parallels between Foe and Robinson Crusoe are their 
moments of diversion. Friday’s switch from a Carib to an African; the insertion of a 
woman into the narrative; the desolation of the island; each of these changes clarifies the 
politics implicit in all narrative construction. These gaps between Coetzee’s text and 
Defoe’s original novel establish the self-reflexivity of the novel’s postmodern 
chronotope. By applying postmodern spatio-temporal relationships to Robinson Crusoe’s 
tale, Coetzee’s novel reveals the political decisions underneath all forms of storytelling, 
even Foe. An author of a text must decide its particular narrative chronotope, and, as Foe 
makes clear, this decision is potentially informed by issues of gender, race, and empire, 
among others. 
Furthermore, Coetzee inserts a fictionalized author. Daniel Foe, imitating the 
historical Daniel Defoe, provides the novel with an intersection between the narrative 
chronotope and its formative process. Existing within a fictional life that closely parallels 
(but never actually intersects with) Defoe’s own biography, Foe imitates Defoe in the 
way that he tells stories. His decision to eliminate Susan Barton from her own narrative 
mimics the chronotopal decisions—and all of the religious and political ideologies 
implicit within—that the historical Defoe made in his own appropriations.29 Like Coetzee 
                                                 
29 We must also remember that Defoe, himself, engages in a kind of imitation, appropriating the 
tale of Alexander Selkirk and other castaways to tell his own story of protestant imperialism. Robinson 
Crusoe is, like Foe, an imitation. So even Defoe cannot claim to be the sole origin of his own story. 
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and other imitators, he is required to engage in the act of retelling or otherwise “sit for 
ever in silence.” 30 
Coetzee’s idea of imitation can be taken a step further. Coetzee has long 
acknowledged the influence of Beckett’s work upon his own prose. Furthermore, he has 
often employed elaborate intertextualities within his novels, referring to authors like 
Dostoevsky, Kafka, Beckett, and, of course, Daniel Defoe. And just as Coetzee’s Nobel 
lecture reveals his own complicity as a “plagiarist” and “imitator” of Defoe’s work, his 
reapplication of an indeterminate, self-reflexive chronotope makes him equally complicit 
as an imitator of Beckett. 
But we can easily include Beckett in this group of “plagiarists” as well. Beckett’s 
imitation is most complicated because, through hypodiegesis, Malone Dies employs a 
kind of self-plagiarism. Within the text, the eponymous, hypodiegetic narrator performs 
narrative strategies that are similar to those employed by Beckett in the formation of the 
diegetic narrative. In Malone’s stories of Sapo and Macmann, the relationship between 
space and time constantly shifts, locations are revised and determined to be inaccurate, 
and the understanding of particular events changes as chronotopal definitions alter. 
Malone imitates the very author of the text in which he exists, producing within Malone 
Dies a self-reflexive imitation. 
Beckett’s imitation is not limited to the narrative confines of this text, however. 
Many critics have recognized the way that he returns to common themes throughout his 
                                                 
30 Can we say that Selkirk’s story provides the end to this string of imitations? I am doubtful. For 
one, Selkirk never wrote his own narrative, relying on authors like Edward Cooke, Woodes Rogers, and 
Richard Steele to retell his story. Within these retellings, there are further references to journals by other 
sailors with no direct relationship to Selkirk’s narrative and even ancient texts. So, for example, Rogers’ 
version is influenced by the journal of the sailor Basil Ringrose (234) and Steele’s retelling of Selkirk’s tale 
is informed by the Aeneid (235). 
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works.31 Issues of desire, the human body, Cartesian dualism, and isolation are but a few 
of the issues to which Beckett returns time and again in his fiction and dramatic works. 
Paul Davies acknowledges this when he states, 
By describing [throughout his body of work] what seem to be distinct 
individuals who are ultimately re-reflections of the same human state, 
Beckett is able to illustrate the human consequences of a philosophical 
perspective, without naming it directly. This is what makes him a literary 
artist, someone who has rendered the consciousness of an age. (47) 
By returning to similar philosophical perspectives in different characters and different 
chronotopes, Beckett’s self-imitation inscribes the nature of human existence, instead of 
discussing it explicitly. Beckett’s inscription (mimicked by Malone’s own notebook 
inscription) resists simplistic reflection through its intertextual, chronotopal dialogue. 
Both Foe and Malone Dies establish spatio-temporal frameworks that exist in a 
kind of binary system, affected by the equally powerful gravitational forces of both 
imitation and self-reflexivity. As the narratives progress and the chronotopal frameworks 
shift within these dialogical systems, the pull of imitation or self-reflexivity adjusts and 
reevaluates the relationship between time and space. Postmodern chronotopal 
indeterminacy relies upon this reciprocally-influenced relationship. Imitation in all of 
these instances is by no means negative; rather it is a necessary aspect of the narrative 
process. Both novels recognize that all stories are, in one way or another, a form of 
imitation, and each text reflects the influence of this imitation on the ways that time and 
space interact within the narratives. Malone Dies and Foe, by employing chronotopes that 
are both indeterminate and self-reflexive, engage in postmodern imitation. They reflect 
                                                 
31 See Abbot, Maude, and Watson. 
68 
upon the act of narrative creation, revealing the aesthetic and political underpinnings that 
shape the ever-changing relationships between time and space in the two novels. 
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